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Debates about teaching intelligent design in public school
science classes are inflaming communities across the nation.
These controversies present thorny Establishment Clause questions at a time when that doctrine is less clear than ever. The
ambiguity is not due to a lack of case law: Just last year, the
Supreme Court issued two seemingly contradictory Establishment Clause decisions, driven by what then-Chief Justice
Rehnquist characterized as “Januslike” interests. McCreary
County v. ACLU, with its focus on government purpose, is more
applicable to curricular disputes such as intelligent design than
Van Orden v. Perry, with its examination of passive, apparently
uncontroversial expression. This Article thus examines
McCreary County within the intelligent design context, focusing
on McCreary County’s decision to import the “objective observer” from the effects-endorsement analysis into the government purpose inquiry. Such analysis makes clear the ways
in which a strict reading of McCreary County leads to undesirable results, and the reasons why the Court should retain
McCreary County’s focus on government purpose, but reject the
expanded role of the objective observer.
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INTRODUCTION

On October 18, 2004, the 3,700-student school district in Dover, Pennsylvania became the first in the nation to require that
its students be taught about the concept of intelligent design
when learning the theory of evolution.1 The Dover school district thus presented in public school science classrooms the idea
that an intelligent agent must be responsible for the origin and
variety of the species because evolution alone could not have
produced such complexity. The Dover school district’s instruction in intelligent design was cursory, requiring only that the

1. Although Dover was the first school district in the country to require such
instruction, other school districts have adopted policies implicitly or explicitly
permitting intelligent design instruction. Most recently, in August 2005, the Rio
Rancho, New Mexico school board specifically voted to permit high school
science classes to discuss alternatives to the theory of evolution. See Martha
Raffaele, New Mexico Schools Could Enter Battle over “Intelligent Design,” WASH.
POST., Oct. 9, 2005, at A7. Additionally, the school board in Grantsburg, Wisconsin
approved teaching “all theories of origin” in June 2004 and modified its policy to
teach “various scientific models/theories of origin” in October 2004. John Angus
Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer, How Should Schools Handle Evolution?, USA TODAY,
Aug. 15, 2005, at A13. Cecil County, Maryland also has adopted a policy
encouraging, but not requiring, the teaching of intelligent design. See Bruce
Alberts, President, National Academy of Sciences, The Evolution Controversy in
Our Schools, Letter to Academy Members (Mar. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.nasonline.org/site/PageServer?pagename=NEWS_letter_president_030420
05_BA_evolution.
Additionally, a note on an issue that is not all semantics: Intelligent design
advocates posit the concept of intelligent design as a “theory.” Used colloquially,
“theory” indicates an untested explanation for a past or future occurrence, similar
to a scientific hypothesis. In its technical, scientific sense, however, “theory”
indicates a well tested, verifiable, and substantially proven scientific explanation
closely akin to the common understanding of “fact.” Scientific facts, by contrast,
are mere observations or results, usually from experimentation, with little value
until understood in the context of a theory. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial
Proceedings, Day 1 PM, at 91–92, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp.
2d 707 (No. 4:04-CV-02688) (M.D. Pa. 2005) (all trial transcripts are available at
http://www.aclupa.org/legal/legaldocket/intelligentdesigncase/dovertrialtranscripts.
htm); NILES ELDREDGE, THE TRIUMPH OF EVOLUTION AND THE FAILURE OF
CREATIONISM 21–24 (2001). Accordingly, this Article refers to evolution as a theory
and creationism and intelligent design as concepts.
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following statement (modified slightly in June 2005) be read to
biology students studying evolution:2
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to
learn about Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and eventually to
take a standardized test of which evolution is a part. Because
Darwin’s Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new
evidence is discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the
Theory exist for which there is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range
of observations. Intelligent Design is an explanation of the
origin of life that differs from Darwin’s view. The reference
book, Of Pandas and People, is available for students who
might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent Design actually involves. With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open mind. The
school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to individual students and their families. As a Standards-driven
district, class instruction focuses upon preparing students to
achieve proficiency on Standards-based assessments.3

In January 2005, when Dover science teachers refused to read
the statement, the school district’s assistant superintendent did
so instead.4 Even before the statement was read in Dover classrooms, however, parents already had challenged its constitutionality in federal court.5 The trial in this case was the first in
the nation to address the evolution-intelligent design dispute
directly.6 Just six weeks after the twenty-one-day trial concluded, the district court ruled soundly for the plaintiffs.7
While the trial was in full swing, the ideological battle also
played out in the Dover school board election, in which the
eight incumbents standing for reelection (all supporters of the
2. The policy, as modified, mentions “other resources” about intelligent design,
including PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN H. KENYON, OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE: THE
CENTRAL QUESTION OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS (2d ed. 1993), available in the school
library. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 16–18.
3. Dover Area Board of Directors, Board Press Release for Biology Curriculum
(Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.ncseweb.org/kitzmiller/DASD_Policy.htm; see also
Jerry Coyne, The Faith that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 233 NEW REPUBLIC 21 (Aug. 22
& 29, 2005).
4. See Lauri Lebo, Experts Won’t Back Dover, YORK DAILY REC., June 19, 2005, at
C1.
5. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
6. See Laurie Goodstein, Evolution Lawsuit Opens with Broadside Against Intelligent
Design, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at A21.
7. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
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intelligent design policy) were voted out of office on November
8, 2005.8
The district court’s strong decision in the Dover case may
dampen the enthusiasm of some intelligent design proponents,
but it certainly will not halt the movement.9 The controversy in
Dover is representative of a rapidly growing number of proposals surfacing across the country requiring that students in
public schools study the concept of intelligent design in science
class, or at least that teachers present a critical view of evolution (the first premise of intelligent design). In 2005 alone,
forty-seven local school boards and fourteen state legislatures
considered such proposals; between 2000 and 2005, sixteen
state boards of education did so also.10 Last November, the
Kansas Board of Education modified its state science standards,
requiring schools to teach the “flaws” of the theory of evolution
and effectively inviting schools to teach the concept of intelligent design.11 Legislatures in Kansas, Minnesota, New Mexico,

8. See Laurie Goodstein, Evolution Board Slate Outpolls Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2005, at A4. The campaign mirrored the community’s turmoil: One incumbent
sent out a letter on behalf of himself and other incumbents criticizing the
Kitzmiller plaintiffs and describing the ACLU as an organization that defends
terrorists as well as the right of the North American Man/Boy Love Association
“to put out information on how adults can lure young children into having sex
with them.” Teresa McMinn, Bonsell, Walczak React to Letter, YORK DAILY REC., Oct.
28, 2005, at A6; see also Teresa McMinn, Facts, or Smear?, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 27,
2005, at A1.
9. See Laurie Goodstein, Schools Nationwide Study Impact of Evolution Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at A20.
10. See Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., Events of the Past Year: December 8, 2004 to
Present, http://www.natcenscied.org/pressroom.asp?year=2005 (last visited Jan.
17, 2006) (documenting legislative activity in 2005); see also Claudia Wallis, The
Evolution Wars, TIME, Aug. 15, 2005, at 28–29. Eugenie Scott, Executive Director of
the National Center for Science Education, noted that as of January 2005, the
middle of the 2004–2005 legislative session in many states, legislators in thirteen
states had introduced eighteen bills regarding the teaching of evolution, which is
double the usual number of the past few years. See Debora Mackenzie, A Battle for
Science’s Soul, NEWSCIENTIST, July 9, 2005, at 8. Some of the proposed legislation
could have extreme consequences: In Florida, a bill was defeated that would have
given public school students a cause of action against a teacher who demonstrated
a “bias” towards evolution in the classroom. Id. at 9.
11. See Kenneth Chang, Evolution and Its Discontents, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005,
at D3; Dennis Overbye, Philosophers Notwithstanding, Kansas School Board Redefines
Science, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at D3. After a parallel set of hearings in 2002,
the Ohio Board of Education voted to allow the teaching of intelligent design. In
Kansas, the proposed standards’ treatment of evolution was so controversial that
just days before their scheduled adoption, the National Academy of Sciences and
the National Science Teachers Association refused to permit the use of their
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and Ohio already have passed state statutes permitting, but not
requiring, science instruction about intelligent design.12 Similar
legislation is pending in Georgia, Michigan, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas, and also may be introduced in Utah and Indiana.13 These existing and proposed
policies and statutes follow on the heels of federal-level support for teaching the concept of intelligent design. Conference
committee language accompanying the federal No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) encouraged a critical teaching of
evolution, and even President George W. Bush weighed in on
this issue in August 2005, expressing support for teaching intelligent design alongside the theory of evolution.14
Whether presented in court or merely as legal advice to a
state or local school board, legal arguments supporting intelligent design already have assumed a common form: (1) The
copyrighted materials in the proposed standards. See Jodi Wilgoren, Kansas Fight
on Evolution Escalates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A11.
12. See Peter Slevin, Battle on Teaching Evolution Sharpens, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
2005, at A1; see also Ker Than, Anti-Evolution Attacks on the Rise, LIVE SCI., Sept. 27,
2005, http://www.livescience.com/othernews/050927_ID_cases.html.
13. See Than, supra note 12 (documenting pending legislation). Some of the
legislation that calls for a critical teaching of evolution is modeled specifically
after Senator Rick Santorum’s failed amendment to the No Child Left Behind Act,
including a bill the South Carolina legislature will take up in January 2006. See
Susan Spath, Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., Antievolution Legislation in South Carolina
Again (June 17, 2005), http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/news/2005/SC/
357_antievolution_legislation_in_s_6_17_2005.asp; see also Alberts, supra note 1;
James Dao, Sleepy Election is Jolted by Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at A12;
Richard Fellinger, State Studies Intelligent Design, YORK DAILY REC., June 21, 2005,
at C1.
Although most intelligent design proponents argue vehemently that teaching
intelligent design does not constitute teaching religion, not all legislators draw a
clear line between science and religion. For example, Utah state representative
Chris Buttars wants to require the teaching of “divine design,” requiring students
to learn that the world was created by “a superior power.” Matt Canham,
Evolution Battle to Flare Up in Utah: Backers of “Divine Design” Theory Want Equal Time
in Schools, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 6, 2005, http://www.sltrib.com/utah/ci_2777333.
Buttars originally planned to introduce a bill to this effect when the Utah legislature
returns in January 2006 but has since indicated he instead will introduce it in the
2007 session if science teachers who teach evolution are not “dealt with” by the state
board of education. See Mark Canham, Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., “Divine Design”
Legislation in Utah on Hold (July 21, 2005), http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/news/
2005/UC374_divine_design_legislation_in_7_21_2005.asp; Mary Beth Schneider &
Robert King, GOP Lawmakers Want Schools to Teach “Intelligent Design,”
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 3, 2005, at 1A (noting support from Indiana legislators
and from the electorate for teaching intelligent design).
14. See Peter Baker & Peter Slevin, Bush Remarks on “Intelligent Design” Theory
Fuel Debate, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at A1; Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Remarks
Roil Debate over Teaching of Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at A14.
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concept of intelligent design is science and should be taught in
the spirit of teaching both sides of a controversy; (2) the theory
of evolution is hostile to religion, thus intelligent design should
be taught to preserve government neutrality towards religion;
(3) a teacher’s ability to teach the concept of intelligent design
is a matter of academic freedom.15 Because the intelligent agent
or agents to whom all credit is given remain unidentified, intelligent design proponents reject the suggestion that the concept
is merely the newest iteration of biblically based creationism.16
On the other side, opponents of intelligent design argue that
because the concept of intelligent design is religious and not
scientific, and because the theory of evolution is scientific and
not religious, teaching intelligent design is motivated by an
impermissible purpose to advance religion in public schools
and generates an effect of advancing religion; such motive and
result both violate the Establishment Clause.17 Accordingly,
because intelligent design advocates’ purpose is nearly always
less overtly religious than that of traditional creationists, discerning the government purpose that motivates an intelligent
design policy is a crucial yet challenging aspect of intelligent
design litigation. In fact, this analysis will be even more difficult after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in McCreary
County v. ACLU.18
In June 2005, the Court issued decisions in two cases involving the public posting of the Ten Commandments on government property. In Van Orden v. Perry, the Court upheld as
constitutional a six-foot-tall granite monument of the Ten Commandments erected on the Texas state capitol grounds nearly
forty years ago, focusing on the passivity of the monument’s
message, the historical, secular meaning of the Ten Commandments, and the longstanding, uncontroversial nature of
the display at issue.19 In McCreary County v. ACLU, the Court
rejected two Kentucky counties’ recent, repeated attempts to
post the Ten Commandments inside their respective county
courthouses, initially by posting the document alone and then
15. See, e.g., John H. Calvert, IDNet, Teaching Origins Science in Public Schools:
Memorandum & Opinion (2001), http://www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org/
legalopinion.htm.
16. See infra Part IV.A.1.
17. See id.; see also, e.g., Michelle Starr, Some Call Design a Step Toward Balance,
YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 19, 2005, at A1.
18. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
19. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
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as part of larger displays.20 McCreary County utilized the initial,
and rarely determinative, aspect of the three-prong Establishment Clause test the Court set forth in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman: “First, the [government action] must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [third, it]
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’”21
While McCreary County thus reconfirmed the primacy of the
Lemon test’s government purpose analysis, Van Orden entirely
disregarded the Lemon test. Whether read individually or taken
together, these two cases amplify the confusion that attends
Establishment Clause doctrine, an area of law prominent scholars have described as chaotic and largely incoherent, and that a
district court characterized, in the wake of McCreary County
and Van Orden, as beset by “utterly standardless” distinctions.22
This chaos is due in part to the “objective observer” or “reasonable observer” test, a legal fiction created and championed
by Justice O’Connor.23 This objective, reasonable observer has
served the courts in Establishment Clause cases as an arbiter of
a statute or policy’s effect, or as a measurer of degree of endorsement.24 Originally, the objective observer was cast as a
well informed hypothetical member of the community, and
thus provided a rough response to the implied question arising
from the Lemon test: “Effect upon, or endorsement as perceived
by, whom?” The objective observer matured over time, but always operated within the context of the effects-endorsement
analysis. Then, McCreary County imported the objective ob20. McCreary County v. ACLU, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2001);
McCreary County v. ACLU, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 686–88 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
21. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
22. See, e.g., Newdow v. Congress, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1244 n.22 (E.D. Cal.
2005); see also Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court’s Emerging
Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28
PEPP. L. REV. 681, 686 n.31 (2001) (collecting scholarly comments from Thomas
Berg, Jesse Choper, John Garvey, Leonard Levy, Marci Hamilton, John Mansfield,
and Antonin Scalia regarding the “incoherence and inconsistency” of the
Establishment Clause cases). This doctrine has become such a quagmire that
another district court, attempting to reconcile and apply McCreary County and Van
Orden, suggested that the “context driven inquiry” applied by Justice Breyer as
the swing vote in Van Orden effectively evaluates the reasonable observer’s
perspective of whether government action created an endorsement of religion.
Twombly v. City of Fargo, 388 F. Supp. 2d 983, 990 (D.N.D. 2005).
23. See infra Part III.B.1.
24. See id.

No. 2]

The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates

425

server’s perspective into the government purpose analysis, an
area previously reserved to the courts and characterized by an
evaluation of a government actor’s actual purpose.25 In
McCreary County, the Court delineated the new boundaries of
the government purpose inquiry: “[T]he eyes that look to purpose belong to an ‘objective observer’ . . . .” and if a religious
motive is hidden “so well that the ‘objective observer . . .’ cannot see it, then without something more . . . it suffices to wait
and see whether such government action turns out to have . . .
the illegitimate effect of advancing religion.”26 Given the constantly changing nature of Establishment Clause doctrine, it is
unclear whether this newly expanded role of the reasonable
observer is a definitive change or merely a temporary shift. Either way, the emerging set of evolution-intelligent design controversies illustrates some difficulties courts will encounter
should they choose to interpret and apply McCreary County
strictly.
Bearing in mind that a reasonable observer brings an increasingly extensive knowledge of issues of law to any analysis, the
second Part of this Article explores the ideas at the root of these
controversies—evolution, creationism, and intelligent design—
and reviews the public perceptions that underlie the evolutionintelligent design debate. The third Part analyzes the line of
cases giving rise to the reasonable observer as an analytical tool
employed by a majority of the Court, and charts the reasonable
observer’s changes over time. These cases set the stage for a
discussion of McCreary County, which both refocuses Establishment Clause doctrine on government purpose and alters
the purpose analysis by invoking the distanced perspective of
the reasonable observer.
The fourth and final Part considers the potential impact of
McCreary County on intelligent design disputes and ultimately
argues for a limited application of McCreary County. Strictly
read, McCreary County changes the fundamental constitutional
harm in an Establishment Clause case from actual government
purpose to perceived government purpose, resulting in a
slightly different formulation of this factor that is both overinclusive and underinclusive. McCreary County also vests the reasonable observer with increasingly vast knowledge of issues of
law (in some cases an education law specialist’s command of
25. See infra Part III.C.
26. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2734–35 (2005).
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NCLB), yet insufficient knowledge of issues of fact. Lastly, it
requires a uniformly de novo standard of review for federal
appellate courts’ inquiries into government purpose without
sufficient justification for expanding the scope of review. Given
the value of an actual purpose inquiry and undesirable consequences resulting from the shift to a perceived purpose inquiry, the Court should retrace some of its steps, as it has done
in this area before, and refocus on government purpose without the aid of the reasonable observer.
The evolution-intelligent design debates raise several noteworthy legal issues. This Article is intentionally limited to a
focus on the government purpose analysis; set aside for the
moment are the questions of effect and endorsement, as well as
coercion and the related importance of Lee v. Weisman.27
II.

AN EVOLUTION-INTELLIGENT DESIGN PRIMER

The evolution-intelligent design debates are marred by a
misunderstanding of the ideas involved, science’s frequent hostility towards religion, and Western religions’ resistance to conceiving of nature itself as divine.28 As discussed later in this
Article, after McCreary County, courts should evaluate government purpose in an intelligent design case from the perspective
of the reasonable observer who presumably is not omniscient
and certainly is not typical, but who will be vested with extensive knowledge. In the Dover case, for example, the courtcreated reasonable observer had an even more extensive understanding of intelligent design than is presented here.29 Because the reasonable observer will be presumed to have a
proper understanding of the ideas underlying any present controversy, this Part revisits the theory of evolution and the concepts of creationism and intelligent design, complex ideas too
often characterized in sound-bite definitions. Then, because the
reasonable observer is deemed to be operating in a social con-

27. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
28. See KENNETH R. MILLER, FINDING DARWIN’S GOD: A SCIENTIST’S SEARCH FOR
COMMON GROUND BETWEEN GOD AND EVOLUTION 19, 57 (1999).
29. See generally Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714–35
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (conducting an endorsement test and employing the reasonable
observer); id. at 735–46 (discussing whether intelligent design is science and
concluding that the reasonable observer would reach the same conclusion as the
court).
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text, the Part assesses the current climate of public opinion regarding evolution, creationism, and intelligent design.
A.

Revisiting the Ideas at Issue
1.

Evolution

Credit for the theory of evolution is in large part properly attributed to Charles Darwin’s 1859 work On the Origin of Species
and his 1871 tome Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to
Sex.30 Darwin’s Origin of Species was revolutionary because it
argued that species of flora and fauna do not permanently exist
in their present forms. Rather, they vary over time as individual members develop inheritable adaptations to their natural
environments that make them more likely to survive than
members of the same species that have not changed or have
changed in less advantageous ways. Mutations upon mutations
lead to diversification within, and eventually among, species.31
The next major intellectual leap in this area, the NeoDarwinian Synthesis, took shape in the 1940s and proposed
that species’ adaptations result in better suited individuals having more offspring that survive at a higher rate, and that variations within a species are inherited specifically through
individual organisms’ genetic code.32 Scientists continue to find
significant support for the theory of evolution and the NeoDarwinian Synthesis in the fossil record, which confirms that
extinct organisms are found in older layers of rock, that living
organisms have become more complex over time, and that dif-

30. Darwin was the first scientist to explore this idea in such depth, but he was
not the first to consider the concept of species’ change over time. See MILLER, supra
note 28, at 32–36 (summarizing the earlier scientific work of William Smith,
Georges Cuvier, and Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire).
31. See George Levine, Introduction to CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES
BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION xvii, xxiv, xxvi (George Stade, ed., Barnes &
Noble 2004) (1859) [hereinafter DARWIN, ORIGIN]; see also ERNST MAYR, WHAT
EVOLUTION IS 75, 116 (2001). Humans were not included in this concept of
evolution through natural selection until Descent of Man. Hamilton Cravens,
Introduction to CHARLES DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION
TO SEX ix, xi (Barnes & Noble 2004) (1871).
32. See generally MAYR, supra note 31. The Neo-Darwinian Synthesis considered
Darwin’s work in concert with that of geneticist Gregory Mendel and naturalist
Alfred Russell Wallace. It resulted mostly from the work of John Burdon
Sunderson Haldane, Ronald Fischer, Theodosius Doebzhansky, and Julian
Huxley. See id.
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ferent species today can be traced back through mutations to
common ancestors.33
Evidence supporting the theory of evolution always has been
questioned, in part because such critical questioning is the
backbone of science, and, in this case, also because of the theory’s perceived social, moral, and religious ramifications. From
the start, Darwin’s theory was the target of criticism because it
ran counter to a literal interpretation of the Genesis creation
story, in which God individually created plant and animal species. That criticism grew in force when the theory of evolution
gained support from advances in genetics. From the perspective of religious adherents to creationism and intelligent design, the danger presented by the theory of evolution is that if
humans were not specially created by God and in the image of
God, then there is no reason to expect humans to behave differently from amoral animals.34 Or, in the words of a letter read
by Representative Tom DeLay on the floor of the U.S. House of
Representatives, tragedies such as the 1999 school shooting in
Columbine, Colorado happen in part because “[o]ur school systems teach the children that they are nothing but glorified apes
who have evolutionized out of some primordial soup of
mud . . . .”35 As its name suggests, Darwin’s Origin of Species
limited itself to a discussion of inter- and intra-species diversification, sidestepping the issue of living things’ ultimate origins.36 Though the theory of evolution is hardly the only
scientific concept with potential consequences for religious

33. See id. at 13, 22. Evidence of responsive mutation is not limited to fossils;
scientists today document such mutation in viruses and bacteria that develop
drug resistance. See TIM M. BERRA, EVOLUTION AND THE MYTH OF CREATIONISM 53
(1990).
34. See ELDREDGE, supra note 1, at 10; KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 92 (2005). As stated by John Buell, president and academic
editor of the Foundation for Thought and Ethics, in a 1995 fundraising letter,
The current deplorable condition of our schools results in large part from
denying the dignity of man created in God’s image. Even junior high
students recognize that if there is no creator, as textbooks teach, then
there is no law giver to whom they must answer, and therefore no need
of a moral lifestyle, much less a respect for the life of their fellow man.
The message of the foundation is that this is simply unacceptable.
Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 6 AM, at 101.
35. Chet Raymo, Darwin’s Dangerous De-evolution, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1999,
at C2; Coyne, supra note 3, at 33.
36. Levine, supra note 31, at xviii.
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faith,37 it has been a constant target of religiously driven criticism for the past 150 years.
Since Darwin’s time, many scientists and theologians have
argued that evolution and religion are compatible, despite frequent antagonism between the two perspectives. Some scientists, such as Brown University biology professor Kenneth
Miller, have published books reconciling the theory of evolution with religious belief.38 Alan Leshner, chief executive of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, has
commented that “the theory of evolution does not, in fact, conflict with the religious views of most Jewish, Christian, Muslim,
Buddhist, or Hindu followers.”39 The official statements of religious leaders reinforce Leshner’s assertion, including Pope
John Paul II’s 1996 Message on Evolution to the Pontifical Academy
of Sciences, which echoed Pope Pius II’s 1950 theistically qualified statement that there is “no opposition between evolution
and the doctrine of the faith about man and his vocation . . . .”40
37. As noted by a federal district court, there are religious implications to “the
theories of gravity, relativity, and Galilean heliocentrism . . . .” Selman v. Cobb
County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1292 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
38. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 28; see also David Barton, A Death-Struggle
Between Two Civilizations, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 297, 310 n.63 (2000); George
Johnson, For the Anti-Evolutionists, Hope in High Places, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at
A3; Claudia Wallis, The Evolution Wars, TIME, Aug. 15, 2005, at 34.
39. Cornelia Dean, Opting Out in the Debate on Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2005, at F1.
40. Pope John Paul II, Message on Evolution to the Pontifical Academy of
Sciences (Oct. 23, 1996), http://www.catholic.net/RCC/Periodicals/Inside/0197/creat2.html; see also Lawrence M. Krauss, School Boards Want to “Teach the
Controversy”: What Controversy?, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at F3; Cornelia Dean,
Evolution Takes a Back Seat in U.S. Classes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at F1.
The current Pope, Benedict XVI, has made similar statements, although the
Archbishop of Vienna questioned public interpretation of the Catholic Church’s
endorsement, provoking a minor controversy in July 2005. On July 7, 2005,
Cardinal Christopher Schönborn, Archbishop of Vienna, expressed in a New York
Times editorial that “[e]volution in the sense of common ancestry might be true,
but evolution in the neo-Darwinian sense—an unguided, unplanned process of
random variation and natural selection—is not.” Christopher Schönborn, Finding
Design in Nature, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A23. Scientists and others called for
Pope Benedict XVI to clarify the Church’s position and reaffirm the earlier
statements of John Paul II and Pius II. See Lawrence M. Krauss, Francisco Ayala, &
Kenneth Miller, Letter to Pope Benedict XVI (July 12, 2005), http://genesis1.phys.
cwru.edu/~krauss/papalletttxt.htm; see also Cornelia Dean, Scientists Ask Pope for
Clarification on Evolution Stance, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at A18; Cornelia Dean &
Laurie Goodstein, Leading Cardinal Redefines Church’s View on Evolution, N.Y.
TIMES. July 9, 2005, at A1. On November 3, 2005, Monsignor Gianfranco Basti, the
director of the Catholic Church’s Science, Theology and Ontological Quest project,
and Cardinal Paul Poupard, the director of the Pontifical Council for Culture,
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The Presbyterian Church (USA) and the Lutheran World Federation have issued official statements accepting the theory of
evolution, as has the American Jewish Congress.41 Similarly,
the Unitarian Universalist Association and the United Methodist Church oppose the teaching of creationism in public
schools.42 Moreover, a “Creator” merited several mentions in
Darwin’s Origin of Species, including the book’s very last sentence:
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers
having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few
forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most
wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.43

The scientific and cultural import of this theory hardly can
be overstated.44 Today, the scientific community is nearly
unanimous in its acceptance of the theory of evolution and its
view of the importance of this theory.45 Nevertheless, despite
this widespread acceptance, only twenty-seven states’ public
school science standards received a passing grade for their
treatment of evolution in a December 2005 report from the

reiterated the Church’s support of science, and evolutionary theory in particular.
See Nicole Winfield, Vatican: Faithful Should Listen to Science, USA TODAY.COM,
Nov. 3, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/ethics/2005-11-03-vaticanscience_x.htm.
41. National Center for Science Education, Statements from Religious Organizations
(Dec. 19, 2002), http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/7445_statements_from_
religious_org_12_19_2002.asp.
42. Id.
43. DARWIN, ORIGIN, supra note 31, at 384.
44. Harvard biology professor emeritus Ernst Mayr has called evolution “the
most important concept in biology.” MAYR, supra note 31, at xiii. A federal district
court recently recognized evolution as “the dominant scientific theory regarding
the origin of the diversity of life . . . accepted by the majority of the scientific
community.” Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 (N.D.
Ga. 2005).
45. See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the
Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751, 804 nn.234–35 (2003)
(collecting statements from prominent scientists regarding the overwhelming
support for the basic tenets of the theory of evolution, and reflecting an
understanding of its role as a central concept of modern scientific knowledge);
Michael Powell, Pa. Case Is Newest Round In Evolution Debate, WASH. POST, Sept.
27, 2005, at A3.
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nonprofit Fordham Foundation; in 2000, thirty-one states had
received a passing grade for their evolution-related standards.46
2.

Creationism

In constitutional law, “creationism” has become a term of art
to describe the beliefs of so-called young-earth creationists,
who date the age of the earth from the chronology suggested in
the Bible and conclude the earth is only 5,000 to 10,000 years
old.47 Young-earth creationists reject evidence that the earth is
approximately 4.5 billion years old by arguing that the Noachian flood led to the appearance of a fossil record because the
organisms that could escape to higher ground or otherwise
survive the inundation did so and those left behind gradually
became buried in sediment.48 Other young-earth creationists
argue that this flood altered chemical and biological processes
to the point that contemporary scientific methods of dating fossils and various artifacts are entirely inaccurate.49 Young-earth
creationists often concede the apparent age of the earth, fossils,
and even surrounding cosmos, while maintaining that the real
age of these things is much less, and they were merely created
to look older.50
As their name suggests, old-earth creationists concede the
earth to be billions of years old. They maintain that God individually created “kinds” of plants and animals sequentially
over great spans of time, and that God works through biological processes to create diversity within species.51 Both groups
rely on the Genesis account to support their claim that God
created all species separately from one another, particularly
46. PAUL R. GROSS, THE STATE OF SCIENCE STANDARDS 2005 at 7, 25 (2005),
available at http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/Science%20Standards.Final%20(12-6).
pdf.
47. See Francis J. Beckwith, Science and Religion Twenty Years After McLean v.
Arkansas: Evolution, Public Education, and the New Challenge of Intelligent Design, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 460–61 (2003); see also MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S
BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO EVOLUTION 5 (1996).
48. See generally JOHN C. WHITCOMB, JR. & HENRY M. MORRIS, THE GENESIS
FLOOD: THE BIBLICAL RECORD AND ITS SCIENTIFIC IMPLICATIONS (1961). This work
is summarized in MILLER, supra note 28, at 61.
49. See generally GEORGE MCCREADY PRICE, THE NEW GEOLOGY (2d ed. 1923);
WHITCOMB & MORRIS, supra note 48.
50. MILLER, supra note 28, at 79–80.
51. Eugenie C. Scott, Science, Religion, and Evolution, in EVOLUTION:
INVESTIGATING THE EVIDENCE 361, 372 (1999), available at http://www.ncseweb.org/
resources/articles/528_science_religion_and_evoluti_6_19_2001.asp.
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focusing on the distinct creation of humans. Thus, all creationists reject the idea of common descent, the theory that existing
plants and animals evolved from simpler organisms. Teaching
either form of creationism, or “creation science,” in a public
school science class has consistently been found to violate the
Establishment Clause.52
3.

Intelligent Design

Although creationists’ arguments generally are based on a
literal or barely interpretive reading of Genesis and are thus
fairly well defined, there is less clarity and even greater variation among the arguments presented by intelligent design proponents.53 This complicates the evolution-intelligent design
debates further and ultimately makes a government purpose
inquiry more difficult and fact-specific. Unlike creationists,
many of intelligent design’s scientific advocates do not dispute
that the Earth is billions of years old or that humans and apes
have a common ancestor.54 In fact, some intelligent design advocates accept the legitimacy of the fossil record as well as corresponding theories in geology and physics.55 The concept of
intelligent design, however, is significantly different from approaches taken by evolutionary theists.
One of two scientific legs on which the concept of intelligent
design stands is the idea of “irreducible complexity.” Lehigh
University biochemistry professor Michael Behe advances this
argument,56 which in a significant sense rekindles the argument
presented in 1802 by William Paley in Natural Theology. Paley
argued that even in their most basic forms, various organisms
(or organs) are so complex that they could not have resulted
from evolution alone and exist only because they are the direct
products of an intelligent designer, a Creator.57
52. E.g. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
53. See, e.g., Michael Powell, Washington Post Staff Writer, Online Discussion: The
Evolution Debate, (Oct. 5, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/
discussion/2005/10/04/DI200510040217_pf.html; see also Laurie Goodstein, Witness
Defends Broad Definition of Science, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A15; Mike Argento,
Intelligent Design’s Plea for Help, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 25, 2005, at A8.
54. See Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 10 PM, at 118.
55. See MILLER, supra note 28, at 93, 164; see also WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI,
INTELLIGENT DESIGN 122–52 (1999).
56. See generally BEHE, supra note 47.
57. See WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY 44–45 (Boston, Gould & Lincoln
1857). In Origin of Species, Darwin responded to Paley’s claim that the vertebrate
eye must have been created in present form because it cannot function without all
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In Behe’s book Darwin’s Black Box, one of the foundational
works of the intelligent design movement, Behe contends that
Darwin’s response is no longer adequate because of scientific
advances that have occurred since Darwin’s death.58 Thus, the
theory of evolution deserves to be revisited. Behe argues that
advances in biochemistry during the 1950s enabled scientists to
study organisms at the molecular level, leading to an understanding that the cell is an irreducibly complex organism that
requires all of its components to function and therefore cannot
be created piecemeal through a process of evolution.59 Because
natural selection can favor only working systems, a cell cannot
be produced through natural selection if it lacks any of its necessary components, which are not working systems in their
own right. Accordingly, the cell’s components could not exist
independently, let alone be preserved and refined through
natural selection on their own.60 Behe argues not only that an
intelligent designer created the first irreducibly complex organism, a bacterium cell, but also that this cell was packed with
genes that would not become active for billions of years and
had the genetic ability to lead to all subsequent life forms.61
What evolution advocates perceive to be the random process of
evolution, intelligent design proponents contend was actually
genetically predestined. Significantly, Behe rejects the idea that
of its various parts. MILLER, supra note 28, at 135 (quoting CHARLES DARWIN, THE
ORIGIN OF SPECIES 187 (Coth ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1956) (1872)). What Paley
assumed was irreducibly complex, Darwin said was in fact not, because earlier
versions of that eye would have had evolutionary value if they resulted in any
new or better sensory ability, and thus that eye could have been protected and
honed through natural selection, evolving from a less complex version of itself.
BEHE, supra note 47, at 211–16.
Harvard professor and evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould, and American
Museum of Natural History curator and evolutionary paleontologist Niles
Eldridge, have proposed a more recent alternate evolutionary answer to the
question Paley poses. They argue that, rather than occurring slowly over time as
Darwin suggested, evolution occurs in bursts when an organism develops a new
characteristic through random mutation that is significantly beneficial; then the
new characteristic changes quickly, resulting in rapid diversification. This is the
theory of punctuated equilibrium. MAYR, supra note 31, at 193, 270.
58. BEHE, supra note 47, at 10.
59. Id.
60. Behe explains that a tangible example of an irreducibly complex system is a
mousetrap, which needs all of its components to function (the hammer, spring,
catch, holding bar, and platform), and whose components do not have other
functional value by themselves. Id. at 4–5, 39.
61. In other words, the genetic code for all of the rest of the organisms that have
ever and will ever exist was packed into the first bacterium. MILLER, supra note 28,
at 162 (quoting BEHE, supra note 47, at 227–28).
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the mechanism of natural selection, with its focus on chance
and adaptation, determined the development of species, yet he
does not propose a specific, step-by-step mechanism in its
place.62
The concept of intelligent design may appeal to evolutionary
theists, particularly because some of the scientists affiliated
with the intelligent design movement accept parts of the theory
of evolution. These two approaches, however, sit on either side
of the only true dividing line in the evolution-creationism continuum as described by National Center for Science Education
director Eugenie Scott.63 That is, the theory of evolution relies
on natural processes to influence change among and within
species, although evolution’s adherents disagree about the degree to which a divine being was or is involved in determining
the laws of nature that dictate those natural processes.64 Importantly, evolution’s adherents agree that the process of evolution
is a separate issue from the existence and form of a divine being.65 In contrast, intelligent design advocates contend that the
issues are inseparable: The irreducible complexity of organs or
organisms only can be explained by the existence and involvement of an intelligent designer (whom they do not specifically
identify). Furthermore, because these issues cannot be disentangled, evolution’s silence about divinity is viewed as hostility
towards religion.66
To the frustration of the scientific community, the irreducible
complexity argument posed by Behe and echoed by some of his
fellow advocates—that the diversity of species and existence of
humans must be attributed to an omniscient, omnipotent designer because of the flaws in the theory of evolution—is a hy-

62. See Laurie Goodstein, Witness Defends Broad Definition of Science, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2005, at A15; Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 11 PM, at
84–87.
63. See Eugenie C. Scott, Nat’l Center for Science Educ., The Creation/Evolution
Continuum (Dec. 7, 2000), http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/9213_the_
creationevolution_continu_12_7_2000.asp. Brown University biology professor
Kenneth Miller and Georgetown University theology professor emeritus John Haught
have testified that they understand the concept of intelligent design to be, in Miller’s
words, “a classic form of creationism known as special creationism.” Transcript of
Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 PM, at 43–45; see also id., Day 5 PM, at 10. Behe
rejects this characterization. Id., Day 10 AM, at 87.
64. See Kenneth L. Woodward, Evolution as Zero-Sum Game, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2005, at A15.
65. See id.
66. Lest the reader wonder, the Author considers herself an evolutionary theist.
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pothesis that cannot be tested, unlike the theory of evolution
which has been tested continually for the past 150 years.67
There is little debate about the unpopularity of intelligent design in the scientific community: The number of scientists who
advance intelligent design is small,68 the overwhelming majority of scientists reject the concept of intelligent design,69 and the
science supporting intelligent design continues to be almost
entirely absent from peer-reviewed journals.70 While intelligent
design proponents view their exclusion from scientific journals
as reflecting a bias against their ideas, many scientists suggest

67. Professor Steve Fuller from the University of Warwick, England testified
that intelligent design is a concept “too young” to have generated sufficient
methods of being tested. Fuller was an expert witness for the school district.
Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 15 AM, at 86; see also Lauri Lebo
& Michelle Starr, Witness: Intelligent Design Needs Boost, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 25,
2005, at A1; MILLER, supra note 28, at 126. In 2002, the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) concluded that intelligent design should not
be taught in schools because the intelligent design movement had “not proposed a
scientific means of testing its claims.” Media Matters for America, Religious
Conservatives Tout “Intelligent Design” as a “Secular,” “Scientific” Alternative to
Evolution (Dec. 21, 2004), www.mediamatters.org/items/200412210002. Given the lack
of a significant intervening publication record, it seems likely the AAAS would
reach the same conclusion today.
Behe, however, argues that it is evolution that is not easily falsifiable, and that
intelligent design is, by comparison, significantly more testable. Transcript of Trial
Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 10 AM, at 86.
68. For a listing of scholars involved in the intelligent design movement, a
chronicle of the half-dozen books published in this area, and a summary of
academic and public debate generated by the intelligent design movement, see
Francis J. Beckwith, Science and Religion, supra note 47, at 470–77 & nn.50–112;
Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of
Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 461, 462–65 & nn.4–23
(2003). See also Jeffrey F. Addicott, Storm Clouds on the Horizon of Darwinism:
Teaching the Anthropic Principle and Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 63 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1507, 1595 (2002); Wexler, supra note 45, at 804 & n.233.
69. See Wexler, supra note 45, at 236.
70. Behe notes that he published a peer-reviewed intelligent design article in
2004 in Protein Science. See Michael J. Behe & David W. Snoke, Simulating Evolution
by Gene Duplication of Protein Features that Requires Multiple Amino Acid Residues, 13
PROTEIN SCI. 2651 (2004); see also Laurie Goodstein, Expert Witness Sees Evidence in
Nature for Intelligent Design, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at A14. But see Coyne, supra
note 3, at 31 (writing after the publication of Behe’s article and noting the absence
of intelligent design articles from scientific peer-reviewed journals); Wexler, supra
note 45, at 807 n.237 (collecting sources supporting this conclusion). Steven C.
Meyer’s paper The Origin of Biological Information and the Higher Taxonomic
Categories is the only intelligent design argument published in a peer-reviewed
scientific journal, but the journal later issued a statement that the article did not
receive proper peer review and failed to satisfy the journal’s scientific standards.
See Coyne, supra note 3, at 31.
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that to the extent intelligent design papers are even submitted,
they are rejected because they are bad science.71
As noted, Behe’s irreducible complexity argument is one of
the two primary scientific bases supporting the intelligent design movement. The other argument, an odds-based approach,
has been developed by Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
professor and mathematician William Dembski. This approach
begins by searching for a “sufficiently complex” pattern of
events or system in nature and then seeks to rule out scientific
necessity or chance as the cause of the complexity: in other
words, establishing the odds of the likelihood of the system
coming into existence randomly as prohibitively low.72 This
approach, too, makes the scientific aspects of the concept inseparable from the existence of an intelligent designer.
Aside from Behe, Dembski, and a few others,73 most of intelligent design’s visible proponents are not scientists or even
academics. Missouri attorney John Calvert is the co-founder of
the Intelligent Design Network, an organization dedicated to
advocating intelligent design instruction in schools.74 Calvert
has given legal advice to school districts and state boards of
education in more than ten states over the past six years; many
of his opinion letters about state science standards and science
curricula are readily available on the Internet.75
Although Calvert frequently cites to Behe’s and Dembski’s
work, other advocates of intelligent design present a view of
intelligent design more overtly tied to religion. In an interview
in December 2004, Albert Mohler, president of the Southern
Baptist Theological Seminary, stated:
I believe in creation, in a full biblical doctrine of creation. I’m
a Christian theologian . . . . But the theory of intelligent design comes down to this. In the entire complexity of the universe as we know it, from something as complex as the

71. Wexler, supra note 45, at 805–07.
72. See Calvert, supra note 15, at 10–14.
73. Most of the research supporting intelligent design is connected with the
Seattle-based nonprofit think tank the Discovery Institute. The organization’s web
site is http://www.discovery.org.
74. The organization’s web site is http://www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org.
75. Calvert has advised school boards or state boards of education in Kansas (in
1999 and in 2005), Missouri, Ohio, West Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, New
Mexico, Nebraska, Iowa, and Minnesota. Letter from John H. Calvert to Darby,
Montana
School
Board
(Feb.
19,
2004),
at
1–2,
available
at
http://www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org/DarbyBoardOpinion.pdf.
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human eye to the glory of the sky and all the cosmos, all the
planets and their proportion, there is more information necessary there than the theory of evolution can explain.76

Similarly, University of California law professor Phillip Johnson has explained his role as the primary legal architect of the
intelligent design movement: “I wanted to redefine what is at
issue in the creation-evolution controversy so that Christians,
and other believers in God, could find common ground in the
most fundamental issue—the reality of God as our true creator.”77 Johnson has commented elsewhere that “[w]ith the success of intelligent design . . . we’re going to understand that,
regardless of the details, the Christians have been right all
along—at least on some major elements of the story, like divine
creation.”78 Terry Fox, pastor of a Wichita, Kansas Southern
Baptist Church attended by 6,000 people each week, characterizes intelligent design as a temporary compromise for creationists: “The strategy this time is not to go for the whole enchilada.
We’re trying to be a little more subtle.”79 Even Dembski, one of
the movement’s two key scientists, has characterized intelligent
design as “the Logos of John’s Gospel restated in the idiom of
information theory.”80 And, when the early intelligent design
primer Of Pandas and People was in its initial stages of development, it was replete with references to “creationism” that
were ultimately replaced by “intelligent design” before the
book’s publication.81
In keeping with their denial that intelligent design is creationism in disguise, intelligent design advocates consistently
frame the debate as a contest between two scientific theories:

76. Media Matters for America, supra note 67.
77. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DEFEATING DARWINISM BY OPENING MINDS 92 (1997).
78. Mark Hartwig, The Meaning of Intelligent Design, BOUNDLESS WEBZINE, July
18, 2001, http://www.boundless.org/2000/features/a0000455.html. See also Phillip
E. Johnson, Starting a Conversation About Evolution, Access Research Network,
(Aug. 31, 1996), http://www.arn.org/docs/johnson/ratzsch.htm.
79. Peter Slevin, Battle on Teaching Evolution Sharpens, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
2005, at A1.
80. Barbara Forrest, Intelligent Design?, 111 NAT. HIST. 73, 80 (Apr. 2002). See also
William A. Dembski, Introduction: Mere Creation, in MERE CREATION 13, 28–29
(1998).
81. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 721–22 (M.D. Pa.
2005); see also Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 6 AM, at 108, 117–
26.
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evolution and intelligent design.82 Despite critics’ characterization of this dualism as, for example, “not unlike recommending
that mustard plasters and bleeding be taken as seriously as antibiotics and heart-bypass surgery,”83 this approach of positing
intelligent design as the single alternative to evolution appears
to have had some success. After Ohio adopted new state science standards in 2002 that called for a critical teaching of evolution, a member of the Ohio Board of Education reported
receiving calls from school districts saying they were “allowing
students to openly debate intelligent design” and that students
were researching intelligent design.84 Similarly, a federal district court wrote in January 2005 that “[b]y denigrating evolution, the School Board appears to be endorsing the well-known
prevailing alternative theory, creationism or variations thereof,
even though the [statement] does not specifically reference any
alternative theories.”85
The idea that an intelligent designer influenced the creation
of human beings necessarily raises the question of the identity
of the designer or designers. It is in this respect that intelligent
design seems to its critics most like creationism in sheep’s
clothing, particularly because many of intelligent design’s
strongest proponents are fundamentalist Christians. Much to
the chagrin of many intelligent design proponents, Behe, Calvert, and others take great pains to explain that the intelligent
designer who created the first cell is not necessarily the JudeoChristian God or any other God, but in fact could be, as the dis82. In 2001, Calvert referred to intelligent design as “one of the only two
possible answers,” claiming that “[e]vidence contradicting the Darwinian theory
is, by default, evidence that supports the Design Hypothesis . . . because design
detection requires the elimination of chance and necessity as the explanatory
cause.” Calvert, supra note 15, at 12, 27. In 2004, Calvert correspondingly advised
a school board that “any discussion of evolution necessarily involves a usually
unstated premise about intelligent design. The core claim of modern evolutionary
theory is that life is not designed.” Calvert, supra note 75, at 2. See also Evan Ratliff,
The Crusade Against Evolution, WIRED, Oct. 2004, available at http://www.wired.
com/wired/archive/12.10/evolution.html. But cf. Beckwith, supra note 47, at 489.
The plaintiffs in the Dover, Pennsylvania case refer to this as a “contrived
dualism” reminiscent of the “evolution science”-“creation science” pairing set
forth in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
at 29, Kitzmiller, No. 4:04-CV-02688 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2005).
83. Chester E. Finn, Jr., Foreword to GROSS, supra note 46, at 9.
84. Terry Phillips, State Issues Producer, Focus on the Family—Citizen Link, Ohio
Paves Way in Evolution Debate, (Dec. 13, 2002), http://www.sciohio.org/sbe1015.htm.
85. Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1309 (N.D. Ga.
2005).
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trict court in the Dover, Pennsylvania trial skeptically noted, “a
space alien or a time-traveling cell biologist.”86 This concession
is necessary given proponents’ claim that intelligent design is
not advancing religious beliefs. Despite this admission, evolution’s supporters—both people of faith and not—vigorously
criticize intelligent design as a religion-driven concept.87 The
district court in the Dover trial reached essentially the same
conclusion in December 2005:
After this searching and careful review of [intelligent design] as espoused by its proponents, as elaborated upon in
submissions to the Court, and as scrutinized over a six week
trial, we find that [intelligent design] is not science and cannot be adjudged a valid, accepted scientific theory as it has
failed to publish in peer-reviewed journals, engage in research and testing, and gain acceptance in the scientific
community. [Intelligent design], as noted, is grounded in
theology, not science.88

B.

The Cultural Context, at Home and Abroad

The evolution-intelligent design battles evoke strongly personal reactions from participants and observers alike because
the central question often perceived to be at issue is the origin
of the human species. Although Americans are split between a
belief in evolution or in creationism, citizens of other Western,
industrialized countries do not present the same division, nor
do they have the adamant exclusion of creationism from school
curricula required by the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause.89
For at least the past quarter-century, Americans have been
fairly evenly divided between belief in the theory of evolution
and in the concept of creationism. A September 2005 Gallup
Poll confirmed that the division has remained roughly constant: Thirty-one percent of Americans believe humans evolved
86. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718; see also Calvert, supra note 15, at 6 n.9.
87. The words differ, but the sentiment is consistent: Intelligent design is an
“invent[ion]” of creationism, Mackenzie, supra note 10, at 8, “creationism in a lab
coat,” Ratliff, supra note 82, at 158, “the most highly evolved form of creationism
to date,” id. at 202 or “a thinly veiled effort to dress up creationism as
science . . . ,” Media Matters for America, supra note 67.
88. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
89. For a discussion of how classification as an Establishment Clause issue
ratchets up a controversy, see generally Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 427–28 (2002).
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from other life forms with divine assistance, twelve percent believe humans evolved from other life forms without divine assistance, and fifty-three percent of Americans believe humans
were created directly—“as is”—by a divine being at some point
within the past 10,000 years.90 Thus, in 2005 the split between
evolution and creationism was fifty-three to forty-three in favor
of creationism, a shift from 2004, when the split was fifty-one to
forty-five in favor of evolution, and 2001, when the split was
forty-seven to forty-five, again in favor of evolution.91 As the
margin of error is three percent and these responses generally
are consistent with Gallup Poll results tracked since 1982,92 it is
fair to conclude that Americans’ beliefs about evolution and
creationism have remained more or less stable across varying

90. CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, Sept. 8–11, 2005, available at http://www.
pollingreport.com/science.htm.
91. National Center for Science Education, Public View of Creationism and
Evolution Unchanged, Says Gallup (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.ncseweb.org/
resources/news/2004/US/724_public_view_of_creationism_and_11_19_2004.asp;
Deborah Jordan Brooks, Gallup News Service, Poll Release: Substantial Numbers
of Americans Continue to Doubt Evolution as Explanation of Origin for Humans
(Mar. 5, 2001), http://www.unl.edu/rhames/courses/current/creation/evol-poll.htm.
The participants were asked, “Which of the following statements comes closest to
your views on the origin and development of human beings: 1) Human beings
have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, but God
guided this process, 2) Human beings have developed over millions of years from
less advanced forms of life, but God had no part in this process, 3) God created
human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last 10,000
years or so?” Options one through three were rotated to eliminate rank bias.
A 2001 National Science Foundation survey is one of the few to claim that a
majority (fifty-three percent of Americans) accepts the theory of evolution.
Cornelia Dean, Evolution Takes a Back Seat in U.S. Classes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005,
at F1, F6. About eighty percent of people in industrialized nations accept the
theory of evolution, as do approximately seventy-five percent of people in
heavily-Catholic Poland and ninety-six percent of people in Japan. Id.
92. Brooks, supra note 91; CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, supra note 90.
Responses to the Gallup Poll from 1982 through 2001 are as follows:
Other
God created
Humans
Humans
(volunteered)/
humans in
developed, but
developed,
present form
God had no
with God
no opinion
part in process
guiding
Sept. 2005
31%
12%
53%
4%
Nov. 2004
38
13
45
4
Feb. 2001
37
12
45
6
Aug. 1999
40
9
47
4
Nov. 1997
39
10
44
7
June 1993
35
11
47
7
1982
38
9
44
9
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Presidential administrations, economic conditions, and phases
of domestic and foreign policy. Additionally, because nearly
half of the adult population in the 2005 and 2004 surveys was
too young to have been represented in the 1982 survey, the
general consistency of the data also suggests that the input
from schools and places of worship has been, on average, no
more or less convincing to young and middle-aged Americans
over the past twenty-five years than it was to their parents’
generations. With Americans evenly divided between evolution and creationism,93 it is not surprising that science teachers
often shy away from teaching the theory of evolution, even absent any official state or local restrictions.94
Creationism and intelligent design advocates are more entrenched and effective domestically than abroad.95 In England,
where some state schools regularly use instructional time for
religious education and observance, the national curriculum
93. The Gallup data may slightly overestimate evolution’s support, according to
other polls. A November 2004 CBS News poll found that only forty percent of
Americans self-identify as evolutionists, a combination of twenty-seven percent
stating evolution has been divinely guided and thirteen percent stating evolution
was unguided. See POLL: CREATIONISM TRUMPS EVOLUTION, CBSNews.com, Nov.
22, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/22/opinion/polls/main657083.shtml.
The July 2005 Harris Poll also reached similar conclusions, finding only thirtyeight percent of Americans think humans evolved from earlier species, although
forty-nine percent of Americans agree generally that plants and animals evolved
from earlier species. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, NEARLY TWO-THIRDS OF U.S. ADULTS
BELIEVE HUMAN BEINGS WERE CREATED BY GOD (2005), http://www.harris
interactive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=581.
94. A February 2005 Education Week article summarized these recent studies:
A survey of teachers in Oklahoma, conducted in 1999, found that about
25 percent of public school life-science teachers placed at least moderate
emphasis on creationism, or the biblical belief that God created the
universe, in their classes. Forty-eight percent believed strong scientific
evidence exists for creationism, the study found . . . [I]n Minnesota, a
survey of first-year biology students at the University of Minnesota-Twin
Cities reported that only 38 percent said their high school biology courses
had emphasized evolution. Twenty percent of those students said their
courses had emphasized creationism, according to that 2004 study.
Similar polls dating back to the 1980s, from states such as Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and South Dakota, closely mirror these results.
Sean Cavanagh, Teachers Torn over Religion, Evolution, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 2, 2005, at
1, 18.
95. See Nicholas Wade, Long-Ago Rivals Are Dual Impresarios of Darwin’s Oeuvre,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at F2. Whether this gap will remain so wide is unclear.
One indication of intelligent design’s momentum is Eastern Europe’s first
conference on the topic, which was held in October 2005 and drew more than 700
attendees. Ondrej Hejma, “Intelligent Design” Supporters Gather, LANCASTERONLINE.COM, Oct. 24, 2005, http://ap.lancasteronline.com/6/czech_intelligent_
design.
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calls for a robust teaching of evolution.96 Select English schools
teach creationism in addition to evolution, though this practice
appears tied to the requests of private benefactors.97 The national curricula of Ireland, Northern Ireland, France, and Canada similarly focus on evolution and leave little room for
creationism or intelligent design, even in publicly funded, religiously affiliated schools.98 The Catholic Church in France
strongly supports teaching evolution, emphasizing the distinction that “[e]volution is a scientific theory; creation is a meaning . . . .”99 Similarly, Serbian Orthodox bishops spoke out in
opposition after the state briefly banned the teaching of evolution in September 2004.100 Australia is the outlier in the Western
industrialized world, permitting its public schools to teach evolution, creationism, or both.101 Two non-Western countries that
do not teach evolution are Turkey, which instructs students in
creationism in elementary and secondary public schools and
where an intelligent design movement is beginning to take
root, and Pakistan, where evolution is no longer taught in universities.102 This, then, is the background for a debate that is
starting to see the inside of federal courtrooms, and likely will
do so with increasing frequency.
III.

THE ESTABLISHMENT QUAGMIRE

Often in tension and sometimes serving as a direct check
upon one another, the First Amendment’s two religion clauses
read, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”103 In 1947,
the Court held in Everson v. Board of Education that the Establishment Clause applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.104 Since that time, the Court’s religion cases have
96. It is the exception rather than the rule for even a religiously affiliated school
in England to teach creationism in a class other than religion. See Michelle Galley,
Evolution Theory Prevails in Most Western Curricula, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 28, 2004, at 8.
97. MacKenzie, supra note 10, at 9. For example, the school financed by Peter
Vardey, Christian fundamentalist and millionaire car dealer, includes instruction
in creationism. Id.
98. Galley, supra note 96, at 8.
99. Id. at 8.
100. Mackenzie, supra note 10, at 9.
101. Galley, supra note 96, at 8.
102. Mackenzie, supra note 10.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
104. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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come to constitute some of its most complex and unpredictable
jurisprudence. As the Court euphemistically noted in McCreary
County v. ACLU, “Establishment Clause doctrine lacks . . . categorical absolutes.”105
Over the past twenty years, because of the endorsement test
Justice O’Connor introduced in Lynch v. Donnelly,106 evaluating
the perspective of the “objective observer” or “reasonable observer” gradually has become part of the analysis of a government action’s effect. Although Justice O’Connor linked the
purpose and effect prongs of the three-prong Lemon v. Kurtzman107 test under the larger question of endorsement, neither
her earlier concurrences nor opinions by other members of the
Court suggest that the government’s purpose should itself be
evaluated only from the perspective of a reasonable observer.
Thus, McCreary County is notable because it reinforces the primacy of a government purpose analysis, while also declaring
the objective observer to be the sole arbiter of government purpose. An analytical distinction between the purpose and effect
prongs as conceived in Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test
may have been delicate—indeed, it remains unclear whether
the endorsement test is a replacement for the Lemon test or
merely a new iteration of the effects prong—but until McCreary
County, the Court at least persisted in drawing a clear technical
distinction between the purpose and effect analyses when it
employed them. As McCreary County is the Court’s most recent
pronouncement about government purpose, it will be relevant
in pending and forthcoming Establishment Clause cases when
the speech at issue is not purely passive, such as the teaching of
the concept of intelligent design in public schools.
A.

The Life of Lemon

In 1971, the Court set forth its well known three-part Establishment Clause test in Lemon v. Kurtzman.108 Even today, it is
with reference to this gatekeeping test that nearly all Establishment Clause analyses by lower courts begin.109 Lemon held
105. 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 n.10 (2005).
106. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
107. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
108. Id.
109. Again, the predominance of the Lemon purpose and effect analysis likely
has more to do with lower courts’ understandable confusion about the proper
standard (and thus they rely upon the last coherent moments of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence) than with the presence of a definitive test. See, e.g., Peck v.
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that to survive an Establishment Clause challenge, the government action in question must (1) have a secular legislative purpose; (2) result in a primary effect that is neutral towards
religion, neither favoring nor inhibiting it; and (3) not create an
excessive entanglement between government and religion.110
The Court and commentators alike acknowledge that while
Lemon no longer has the full support of a majority of the Court,
Lemon’s ideological successor has yet to be anointed.111 Although frustrating to those who mine these cases in search of
guiding precedent, the Court’s almost haphazard use of or entire disregard for the Lemon considerations is now standard.
As the Court noted in McCreary County, the government
purpose prong of Lemon has rarely been invoked to invalidate a
government statute or policy. More often than not, the Court
has accepted the government’s stated secular purpose as constitutionally sufficient.112 Some scholars even have speculated
that the Court might abandon the secular purpose test altogether.113 Such speculation was not unwarranted before
McCreary County, particularly because only five of the Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause cases have held a statute or policy to be constitutionally infirm because of an impermissible
government purpose.
In Epperson v. Arkansas in 1968, the first case in which the
Court found a statute to be unconstitutional because of its impermissible purpose, the Court struck down a statute prohibit-

Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 04-4950-CV, 2005 WL 2649472, at *14 (2d Cir.
Oct. 18, 2005); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), aff’g Glassroth v.
Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2002); DeStefano v. Emergency Hous.
Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 405–06 (2d Cir. 2001). In some cases, such as Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005), the parties concede
that the Lemon test is controlling. Kitzmiller, Memorandum and Order (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 13, 2005) (denying Defendant Dover Area School District’s motion for
summary judgment).
The Seventh Circuit has interpreted McCreary County as “reaffirming” the
Lemon test. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2005). Although
McCreary County does not replace the Lemon test, to say that it reaffirms that test
overstates the holding of McCreary County and the consistency of Establishment
Clause doctrine.
110. 403 U.S. at 612–13.
111. See, e.g., Addicott, supra note 68, at 1518; Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The
Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323,
328; Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL.
499, 499–503 (2002).
112. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 97–98 (2002).
113. See id. at 98.
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ing the teaching of evolution.114 Twelve years later, in Stone v.
Graham, the Court rejected a school district’s efforts to post a
copy of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms,
despite the project’s being privately financed and the Ten Commandments’ bearing a small disclaimer about the secular value
of the text.115 In 1985, the Court in Wallace v. Jaffree declared unconstitutional a state statute “authorizing a one-minute period
of silence in all public schools for meditation or voluntary
prayer,” which replaced a state statute permitting a mere moment of silence with the use of that time unspecified.116 Then, in
Edwards v. Aguillard, decided in 1987, the Court rejected a mandatory “balanced treatment” approach to teaching evolution
and “creation science.”117 Eighteen years passed before the
Court again struck down government action because of an illegitimate purpose in its 2005 decision in McCreary County.
Particularly since Lemon, Establishment Clause doctrine has
become increasingly fractured, assuming unpredictable and
ever-changing forms.
B.

The Objective, Reasonable Observer: At First
an Evaluator of Effect and Endorsement

The objective, or reasonable, observer first appeared in an Establishment Clause case in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984118 and gradually became a part of the
Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine as a means for evaluating the constitutionality of a government action’s effect. The
Court first adopted the general idea of considering whether
government action created an apparent endorsement of religion, and later specifically adopted the reasonable observer
analysis.
1.

Emerging in Justice O’Connor’s Concurrences

In Lynch, the Court held 6-3 that a city did not violate the Establishment Clause when it included a crèche in its annual outdoor Christmas display, which also featured reindeer, images
114. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
115. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
116. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
117. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The statute stipulated that if evolution was taught,
“Creation-Science” must be taught as well. There was no statutory or other
requirement, however, to teach either concept.
118. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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of Santa Claus, and strings of small colored lights.119 The Court
concluded that the crèche was constitutionally permissible as
part of a public holiday celebration, despite its religious nature.
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor introduced a “clarification” to Lemon that since has become known as the endorsement test.120 Specifically, Justice O’Connor proposed that a
court consider both “the intention of the speaker”—the subjective government purpose—and “the ‘objective’ meaning of the
statement in the community”—its effect.121 If the government’s
actual purpose was improper, the statute or policy could offend the Constitution notwithstanding its effect; likewise, an
effect of appearing to endorse religion could invalidate a statute or policy regardless of a constitutionally proper intent.
In this formulation, a court would view the purpose of the
government as speaker from its own judicial perspective and
shift its focus to the perspective of the reasonable observer
when evaluating the perceived effect. As Professor Timothy
Zick describes the initial endorsement test, “there [were] two
symbolic meanings in play—the meaning to a potential insider . . . ,” the government’s subjective purpose, “and the
meaning to a potential outsider . . . ,” the perceived effect of the
statement in the community.122 While the objective observer
eventually would become the heart of the endorsement test, at
this point the concept remained shadowy and ill defined.123
One year later, a slightly more articulated objective observer
appeared in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree.
The Court’s decision was again 6-3,124 this time concluding that
an Alabama statute permitting a moment of silence or voluntary prayer in public schools violated the Establishment Clause
because of an impermissible government purpose.125 The
Court’s analysis of government purpose was demanding, reviewing the two predecessors to the statute at issue (one per119. Id. at 671–72.
120. Although Justice O’Connor consistently situated her endorsement test as
the newer version of the Lemon test, scholars split on whether the test is merely an
interpretation of Lemon or an alternative to it altogether. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Quo
Vadis, supra note 111, at 360.
121. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
122. Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a
First Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2370 (2004).
123. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
124. Five justices formed the majority opinion and Justice O’Connor concurred
in the judgment.
125. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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mitting a moment of silence and the other authorizing teacherled prayer) and concluding that the religious purpose that motivated the first two statutes also motivated the third.126
Justice O’Connor’s concurring analysis of government purpose in Wallace expressed caution and deference to the government’s stated purpose, finding an impermissible religious
motivation only because “it is beyond purview that endorsement of religion or a religious belief ‘was and is the law’s reason for existence.’”127 Then turning to the separate question of
the statute’s effect, Justice O’Connor contended that the relevant question was “whether an objective observer, acquainted
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement” of religious
activity.128 From her perspective, the Alabama statute failed the
endorsement test, too, because the religious purpose was
transparent and would be clear to an objective observer.129 In
this concurrence, the effects portion of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test began its slow collapse into the government
purpose portion of the same test. Because the objective observer in Wallace is aware of the same facts regarding legislative intent as is the Court (and will become even more so over
time), the objective observer and the Court must reach the
same conclusion about government purpose.130 If not, it is either because the Court lacks objectivity in its analysis,131 or because it has failed to endow an objective observer—a construct
of its own creation—with sufficient knowledge so that it would
reach the same conclusion as the Court. Neither option is
likely.
2.

The Early Stages of Adoption

In 1989, the Court split 5-4 in an opinion suggestive of the
McCreary County-Van Orden pairing, reaching seemingly inconsistent decisions arising from a set of similar circumstances. In
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court held that a county’s
display of a crèche inside the courthouse constituted an im126. Id. at 56–60.
127. Id. at 75, (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 108 (1968)).
128. Id. at 76.
129. Id. at 78.
130. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 293–94 (1987).
131. Id.
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permissible establishment of religion, while the county and
city’s outdoor display of a menorah next to a Christmas tree
did not.132 From the perspective of some scholars and Justices,
this shift in the Court’s theoretical framework marked the point
where Establishment Clause doctrine went from bad to
worse.133 In County of Allegheny, the plurality first set forth the
Lemon test and commented that its recent focus had been on the
first two prongs of Lemon: government purpose and effect, or
endorsement.134 Then, the Court favorably cited part of Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test as proposed in Lynch, Wallace,
and other cases, and neatly shoehorned its precedent into the
effects-endorsement concept. In the Court’s words, “[w]hether
the key word is ‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the
essential principle remains the same.”135
Not all members of the majority joined Justice Blackmun’s
entire opinion, but a majority did adopt the concept of evaluating the effect of a government action by considering (apparently from a judicial perspective) whether the government
action created an apparent endorsement of religion. The portion of Justice Blackmun’s opinion applying the perspective of
the reasonable observer did not garner a majority, though as
Justice Stevens noted a few years later, five Justices subscribed
to the concept of a reasonable person evaluating whether the
policy created an endorsement of religion, if not the reasonable
person.136 In particular, Justice Brennan set forth contradictory
factual conclusions, both of which could be reached by reasonable people, and rejected the idea that the reasonable person
could only reach one conclusion: namely, the conclusion set
forth by the plurality.137
The reasonable observer gained additional definition in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in County of Allegheny, which ex132. 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989).
133. See, e.g., id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(the “test is flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice”); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1293 (2d ed. 1988); Smith, supra note
132, at 293–94; Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701,
711–12 (1986).
134. 492 U.S. at 592–93.
135. Id. at 593.
136. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 n.4
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620
(Blackmun, J., writing for the plurality); id. at 635–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring);
and id. at 642–43 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
137. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 642–43 (Brennan, J., concurring).

No. 2]

The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates

449

panded the reasonable observer’s base of knowledge further
still. In particular, Justice O’Connor explained that both the
“history and ubiquity” of a publicly displayed religious symbol
matter to a reasonable observer, because these factors compose
part of the context a reasonable observer would consider when
determining whether there is a perceived endorsement.138 In
this manner, County of Allegheny set the stage for the Court’s
extensive examination of historical context via the reasonable
observer in Santa Fe139 and in McCreary County. Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in County of Allegheny focused almost
exclusively on whether the displays had the impermissible effect of creating an apparent endorsement of religion; the government’s apparent purpose was one part of this consideration,
but Justice O’Connor took the stated purpose at face value and
did not probe it further.
In 1995, the Court juggled the First Amendment’s two religion clauses and held 7-2 in Capitol Square Review & Advisory
Board v. Pinette that Establishment Clause concerns did not
permit the municipal board to deny the Ku Klux Klan’s request
to temporarily display a cross in the ten-acre plaza surrounding the Ohio state capitol building.140 While explicitly stating it
was not applying the endorsement test, the Court held that because the cross was private speech not attributable to the government, there could be no perceived government endorsement of a religious message.141 Because the Board had permitted rallies and other unattended displays in the same area by
various community groups, including religious groups, the
Court determined that government neutrality towards religion
mandated granting the Ku Klux Klan’s request.142 A majority
endorsed the reasoning just described, but the portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion rejecting the endorsement test was joined
by only three other Justices.

138. Id. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The question under the endorsement
analysis, in short, is whether a reasonable observer would view such longstanding
practices as a disapproval of his or her particular religious choices, in light of the
fact that they serve a secular purpose rather than a sectarian one and have largely
lost their religious significance over time.”).
139. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
140. 515 U.S. 753. Although the holding was 7-2, only four Justices, including its
author, signed on to the entire opinion. See id. at 757.
141. Id. at 763–64, 770.
142. Id. at 757–58, 760–61.
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Justice O’Connor concurred in part in Capitol Square, writing
separately to defend the endorsement test and acknowledge
the distinct analyses of government purpose and effect.143 Notably, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence gained the support of
Justices Souter and Breyer for the objective (now “reasonable,
informed”) observer who evaluates whether the government
action has the effect of appearing to endorse religion.144 Although Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens both employed
the analytical framework of the reasonable observer, they
reached different conclusions about the ultimate question of
whether a reasonable observer would perceive the Klan’s cross
as an endorsement of religion. Justice O’Connor acknowledged
that the reasonable observer “is presumed to possess a certain
level of information that all citizens might not share.”145 Justice
Stevens responded that because this reasonable observer was
presumed to know the Court’s holding in Capitol Square before
it was issued, Justice O’Connor’s reasonable person would
need to be a “well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the tortlaw model.”146 Justice O’Connor admitted her reasonable observer has extensive knowledge of the history and context of
the state action, but denied vesting the reasonable observer
with sophisticated knowledge of First Amendment law.147 Justice O’Connor also criticized Justice Stevens’s misapplication of
the reasonable observer as a mere “casual passerby.”148
3.

The Objective, Reasonable Observer Accepted

In 2000, a majority of the Court agreed that when it considers
whether government action has created an endorsement of religion it will evaluate that question from the perspective of the
reasonable observer. In Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe,149 the Court held 6-3 that a school board policy permitting
student-led, student-initiated prayer, delivered over the public
address system at a high school football game, constituted an
impermissible establishment of religion. Focusing on whether
the prayer would result in an actual or perceived endorsement
143. Id. at 773–74 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 773.
145. Id. at 780.
146. Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 778–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 778–79.
149. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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of religion (in other words, paying particular attention to the
effect), the Court examined the perspective of an objective
Santa Fe High School student regarding not only the “text and
history” of the relevant school board policy, but also the delivery of a pre-game prayer.150 In this context, the Court approvingly quoted Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test as set forth
in her Wallace concurrence, explicitly accepting the reasonable
observer as the appropriate arbiter of any perceived endorsement.151
It is unclear from the Court’s opinion whether the apparent
endorsement alone was sufficient to invalidate the pre-game
prayer or whether the Court’s consideration of perceived endorsement may have been merely the first part of its evaluation
in the coercion analysis imported from Lee v. Weisman.152 Even
if the endorsement inquiry was merely another way of characterizing the speech as not private speech but instead speech of
the school that had the impermissible effect of coercing religious observance, Santa Fe adds to this body of law an adoption of the reasonable observer as the judge of the speech’s
effect. In its brief (and separate) government purpose analysis,
the Court examined the text of the policy as well as the relevant
history, concluding “it is reasonable to infer” that the policy
was motivated by an impermissible purpose of advancing religion.153 This inference did not yet belong to the reasonable
observer; it was still the purview of the Court.
4.

Applying the “Standard”

Examining an alleged effect of endorsement from the reasonable observer’s perspective seemed routine by 2002 when the
Court decided Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which upheld 5-4
Ohio’s private school voucher and tutoring funding program
against an Establishment Clause challenge.154 After a brief review of the program’s historical context, the Court held that the
state program was motivated by a secular purpose of providing better educational opportunities the poorest students in the

150. Id. at 307–08.
151. Id. at 308.
152. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). See Mark W. Cordes, Prayer in Public Schools After Santa
Fe Independent School District, 90 KY. L.J. 1, 28 n.163 (2002); see also Santa Fe, 530
U.S. at 301–13.
153. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309.
154. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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“demonstrably failing” 75,000-student Cleveland City School
District.155 The Court then turned to the heart of the decision,
an effect analysis that remained technically independent from
the government purpose analysis. In reaching its ultimate conclusion that the program was not marred by an unconstitutional effect, the Court first characterized and contextualized its
precedent, stating, “[W]e have repeatedly recognized that no
reasonable observer would think a neutral program of private
choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur of government
endorsement.”156
Foreshadowing McCreary County, Zelman’s conclusion about
effect continued to blur the Court’s perspective and the reasonable observer’s perspective of government intent.157 In the
Court’s words, “[a]ny objective observer familiar with the full
history and context of the Ohio program would reasonably
view it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor
children in failed schools, not as an endorsement of religious
schooling in general.”158 Zelman makes clear that, to the extent
that the perceived government purpose is part of the policy’s
effect, the objective observer must echo the Court’s conclusion.
Although the Court in Santa Fe had situated the reasonable
observer as a high school student exposed to the pre-game
prayer, in Zelman the Court returned to a more general view of
reasonable observer as an adult community member. This return occurred despite the fact that the program’s vouchers
were used almost exclusively to pay tuition for children to attend parochial schools. Unlike the students in Santa Fe, who
were attending a high school football game open to their parents and other community members, the students in Zelman
had a much greater opportunity than their parents or other
community members to perceive endorsement: They were the
ones attending the parochial schools and were the direct recipi155. Id. at 644, 649.
156. Id. at 654–55. Although the case the Court cited for this proposition, Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), stands for this idea generally, Mueller was decided in
1983, when Justice O’Connor was still the endorsement test’s only proponent.
157. Although Professor Steven D. Smith noted this analytical collapse in his
1987 article, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the “No Endorsement” Test, supra note 130, at 331, the Court’s opinions did not
explicitly demonstrate the collapse in full until McCreary County.
158. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655.
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ents of religious instruction. In part, this return to the “objective observer as adult community member” model is necessary
for the Court to reach the conclusion it does because an objective student in Zelman would likely perceive a greater degree of
endorsement than did the Court and its reasonable observer.
Furthermore, the return is consistent with the objective observer as characterized in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Wallace and later opinions. As part of its admittedly practical
“belt and suspenders” approach, the district court in the Dover,
Pennsylvania case evaluated the intelligent design policy from
the perspective of both the reasonable high school student and
the reasonable adult community member.159
The last hint of Establishment Clause principles before
McCreary County and Van Orden was in the Court’s 2004 decision in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, in which
atheist father Michael Newdow challenged the school board
policy and corresponding state statute requiring daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in his daughter’s school because the Pledge includes the words “under God.”160 Despite
being decided on its merits at the district and appellate levels,
the Supreme Court decided the case on procedural grounds,
concluding that as a non-custodial parent, Newdow lacked
standing to bring suit on his daughter’s behalf. Nonetheless,
Justice O’Connor took the opportunity to champion the endorsement test once again in her concurrence. Justice O’Connor
focused on the effects aspect of the endorsement test, framing
the question as “whether the ceremony or representation
would convey a message to a reasonable observer, familiar
with its history, origins, and context, that those who do not adhere to its literal message are political outsiders.”161 Again, the
reasonable observer is not the five-year-old girl whose claimed
injury was necessary to the lawsuit nor any other reasonable
schoolchild, but rather an adult community member who embodies “a community ideal of social judgment, as well as rational judgment . . . .”162 As in Zelman, the reasonable observer’s
conclusion follows from what Justice O’Connor would have the
Court conclude:
159. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714, 723, 729 (M.D.
Pa. 2005).
160. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
161. Id. at 43 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 35.
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[T]he relevant viewpoint is that of a reasonable observer,
fully cognizant of the history, ubiquity, and context of the
practice in question. Such an observer could not conclude
that reciting the Pledge, including the phrase “under God,”
constitutes an instance of worship . . . . A reasonable observer would note that petitioner school district’s policy of
Pledge recitation appears under the heading of “Patriotic
Observances,” and the California law which it implements
refers to “appropriate patriotic exercises.”163

Thus, from Lynch through Elk Grove, the perspective of the
reasonable observer was increasingly employed to evaluate
whether a perceived endorsement of religion resulted from a
statute or policy. As Professor Kent Greenawalt noted ten years
ago, “[t]he overall trend in [Justice O’Connor’s] opinions has
been to pack more awareness of relevant factors into the reasonable person.”164 That trend has continued, and today’s reasonable observer is a veritable Jeopardy! champion. Even
through Santa Fe and Elk Grove, however, the reasonable observer was absent from the Court’s government purpose analysis, which remained technically distinct from its effects analysis. Then came McCreary County.
C.

McCreary County v. ACLU: An Objective, Reasonable
Observer’s Perspective on Governmental Purpose

Because Establishment Clause doctrine is so splintered, the
Court’s next moves regarding the reasonable observer are quite
uncertain. A strict reading of McCreary County, such as is advanced in this Article, can lead to undesirable results, which
are explored in the final Part of this Article. While it is impossible to predict the length of time between McCreary County and
the Court’s next purpose-driven Establishment Clause case, it
is likely that at least a few years will pass before McCreary
County is formally affirmed in whole or in part, distinguished
into irrelevance,165 or discarded outright. During that time, dis163. Id. at 40–41.
164. Greenawalt, supra note 111, at 372.
165. Some lower courts already are reading the McCreary County-Van Orden
distinction as focusing on the interior or exterior nature of the display without
much regard for McCreary County’s emphasis on government purpose. See, e.g.,
ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 775–78 (8th Cir. 2005) (en
banc); Card v. City of Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1172–73 (W.D. Wash. 2005);
Russelberg v. Gibson County, No. 3:03-CV-149-RLY-WGH, 2005 WL 2175527, at
*2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 7, 2005). Others, such as the district court in the Dover,
Pennsylvania case, employ both the endorsement test and Lemon’s purpose and
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trict courts and courts of appeal will be bound by McCreary
County and all of its unfortunate side effects.
In McCreary County, the Court again invoked the reasonable
observer as the arbiter of endorsement but did not apply a traditional effect analysis. Instead, McCreary County is a decision
driven by a government purpose analysis.166 Citing Santa Fe
frequently, the Court demonstrated the degree to which it has
conflated the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test,
thereby depriving courts of the authority to evaluate government purpose without involving the legal fiction of the reasonable observer.
Focusing on the government purpose analysis allowed the
Court to delve into the entire recent history preceding the government action at issue. In Wallace and Edwards, the Court
made clear that the counties’ earlier actions were crucial in
evaluating the constitutionality of their later actions. The tumult began when two neighboring Kentucky counties posted
functionally identical displays in the hallways of their individual courthouses. Each display was composed of a large,
abridged copy of the Ten Commandments, including a biblical
citation. The texts were unaccompanied by an explanation of a
secular purpose. After a lawsuit was filed but before the district
court acted on the plaintiffs’ request that the displays be removed pending the outcome of the case, both counties’ elected
governing boards approved resolutions to expand the exhibits.
The second set of identical exhibits retained the copy of the Ten
Commandments from the original displays and added eight
other social and political documents with religious references,
all in smaller frames, as well as explanations of why each
document is part of Kentucky’s “precedent legal code.”167
effect inquiries, treating the analysis as though the reasonable observer’s
analytical work is separate from the purpose analysis. See Kitzmiller v. Dover
Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
166. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2728 (2005); see also
O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiffs in the Dover, Pennsylvania case asserted that even in McCreary
County, “purpose evidence [is] relevant to the [endorsement] inquiry
derivatively—just as it always was to Lemon’s effect analysis . . . .” Brief in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 13,
Kitzmiller, No. 4:04-CV-02688 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2005). This interpretation
misconstrues McCreary County, which does not adopt Justice O’Connor’s
endorsement test wholesale, but rather explicitly frames its analysis as a
government purpose inquiry under Lemon.
167. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2727. In the Court’s words:
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The district court temporarily enjoined the first and second
displays in both counties, determining that none was motivated by a secular governmental purpose and that a reasonable
observer would conclude that all the displays have the effect of
appearing to endorse religion.168 A short while later—and
without appealing the preliminary injunction—the two counties hung on their courthouse walls a third set of identical displays, entitled “The Foundations of American Law and
Government.” These displays consisted of a longer version of
the Ten Commandments, seven other documents (some of
which were previously included in the second set of displays),
a picture of Lady Justice, and statements explaining the significance of each document.169 The district court held that the third
displays, too, were impermissibly motivated by a government
purpose of endorsing religion.170 The counties appealed this
holding to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and, ultimately,
to the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision and further stated that it considered the counties’ unrelenting defense of the displays in the present litigation
to support the conclusion that they were motivated by a religious purpose.171
First setting forth the applicable law, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of Lemon’s government purpose inquiry, noting that although the Court rarely strikes down a
statute or policy as unconstitutional because of an illegitimate
government purpose, the government purpose consideration
The documents were the “endowed by their Creator” passage from the
Declaration of Independence; the Preamble to the Constitution of
Kentucky; the national motto, “In God We Trust”; a page from the
Congressional Record of February 2, 1983, proclaiming the Year of the
Bible and including a statement of the Ten Commandments; a
proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln designating April 30, 1863, a
National Day of Prayer and Humiliation; an excerpt from President
Lincoln’s “Reply to Loyal Colored People of Baltimore upon Presentation
of a Bible,” reading that “[t]he Bible is the best gift God has ever given to
man”; a proclamation by President Reagan marking 1983 the Year of the
Bible; and the Mayflower Compact.
Id. at 2729–30.
168. ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 686–88 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
169. ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 846–47 (E.D. Ky. 2001).
The seven other documents were copies of the Magna Carta, the Mayflower
Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution’s Bill of
Rights, the national motto, the lyrics to the Star Spangled Banner, and the preamble
to the Kentucky Constitution. Id.
170. Id. at 849–50.
171. ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 449 (6th Cir. 2003).
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has not diminished in importance.172 Describing the common
theme of Establishment Clause doctrine as promoting “neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion,” the Court explained that “[b]y showing a purpose to favor religion, the government ‘sends the . . . message
to . . . nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members . . . .’”173 Thus,
an apparent illegitimate purpose behind a government action
can be enough to invalidate it.174
With this background, the Court declared, “The eyes that
look to [government] purpose belong to an ‘objective observer,’
one who takes account of the traditional external signs that
show up in the ‘text, legislative history, and implementation of
the statute,’ or comparable official act.”175 This objective, reasonable observer, as in cases before, considers the public record
and bases his decision on “openly available data supported by
a commonsense conclusion . . . .”176 Rather than being an “absentminded” individual limited to evaluating the present circumstance, the reasonable observer is “presumed to be familiar
with the history of the government’s actions and competent to
learn what history has to show.”177 Before McCreary County, the
Court had often described this fictional reasonable observer,
while also declaring that the reasonable observer was the
proper judge of a statute or policy’s effect.178 The Court’s earlier
cases, though, had not ceded to the reasonable observer the
central role in interpreting government purpose. Thus, although McCreary County did little to modify the characteristics
of the reasonable observer, it swiftly and subtly altered the reasonable observer’s fundamental function.179

172. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2732–33.
173. Id. at 2733 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–10
(2000)).
174. Id. at 2733–34.
175. Id. at 2734 (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308).
176. Id. at 2735.
177. Id. at 2737 (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308 and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 73 (1985)).
178. See supra Part II.B.
179. But see O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1224–25 (10th Cir.
2005) (applying McCreary County and conducting an analysis of the government
actor’s actual purpose rather than the apparent purpose as perceived by the
objective observer).
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Addressing the crux of the government purpose inquiry, the
Court noted that although it generally defers to a stated government purpose, a secular government purpose must be primary and not merely a sham.180 However, McCreary County
held that the perceived purpose is what ultimately matters. The
Court rejected “a judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of
hearts” and declared that “[a] secret motive stirs up no strife
and does nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents, and it
suffices to wait and see whether such government action turns
out to have (as it may even be likely to have) the illegitimate
effect of advancing religion.”181 In other words, there are limits
to the government purpose inquiry, and they are the limits of
the reasonable observer’s perceptions.182 Unlike the earlier applications of Lemon and iterations of the endorsement test in
which there were two meanings at issue (the government’s
subjective purpose and the objective or reasonable observer’s
perception), the only meaning at issue after McCreary County is
the perceived government intent.
After setting forth the applicable legal framework, the Court
quickly reviewed and rejected the first displays—the solitary
postings of the Ten Commandments—by noting the absence of
any secular explanation: “The reasonable observer could only
think that the Counties meant to emphasize and celebrate the
Commandments’ religious message.” The Court characterized
the second set of displays as “an indisputable, and undisputed,
showing of an impermissible purpose . . . [that] the reasonable
observer could not forget . . . .”183 The Court dismissed the explanatory statements contained in the third set of displays as
“only . . . a litigating position” and noted the absence of any
further action by either county’s elected governing board.184
Then, referring to the cumulative effect of the counties’ three
sets of displays, the Court concluded, “If the [reasonable] observer had not thrown up his [or her] hands, he [or she] would
probably suspect that the Counties were simply reaching for
any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses constitutionally required to embody religious neutral-

180. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2735–36.
181. Id. at 2734, 2735.
182. Id. at 2726.
183. Id. at 2738–39.
184. Id. at 2740.
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ity.”185 The temporal boundaries of the final display’s context
are unclear, though the Court noted that a governmental
body’s earlier actions do not “forever taint any effort on their
part to deal with the subject matter.”186 Given that the displays
in question were all erected within one year, some even after
the lawsuit was filed, the Court properly left this question
open.
Although the majority opinion focused on the reasonable observer’s perspective on government purpose, Justice O’Connor’s brief concurrence appeared to conflate further the government purpose and effect inquiries. She wrote without additional explanation, “The purpose behind the counties’ display
is relevant because it conveys an unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.”187 This statement also
could reflect a focus on effect; a subjective government purpose
inquiry may still remain a separate analysis. Had the Court
taken this approach, it would have by implication preserved its
role as arbiter of the government purpose inquiry while considering the issue one of effect and endorsement, properly under the purview of the reasonable observer.
Joined in full or in part by three other Justices, Justice Scalia
dissented. He argued that the original intent—and thus the
controlling interpretation—of the Establishment Clause was to
prevent government from coercing participation in religion,
not to prevent religion from being a part of public life.188 Justice
Scalia criticized the majority’s focus on the apparent purpose of
the government action rather than on the actual purpose: It
was, he said, an ill advised departure from what he views as
the wrongly decided Lemon test and its progeny. Under the
Court’s new formulation, he argued, “the legitimacy of a government action with a wholly secular effect would turn on the
misperception of an imaginary observer that the government officials behind the action had the intent to advance religion.”189
Justice Scalia further criticized the majority opinion for “shifting the focus of Lemon’s purpose prong from the search for a
genuine, secular motivation to the hunt for a predominantly
185. Id. at 2741.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2747 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 2753–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in full, and Justice Kennedy joined in part.
189. Id. at 2757.
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religious purpose . . . ,” which can only be satisfied by “a rigorous review of the full record.”190
Finally, Justice Scalia applied the majority’s test to conclude
that there was no impermissible purpose apparent from the
counties’ first, second, or third displays. As part of this analysis, Justice Scalia echoed Justice Stevens’s opinion in Capitol
Square, criticizing the majority’s presumptions about the
knowledge imputed to the reasonable observer.191 This point of
disagreement emphasizes that the Court’s reasonable observer
is reasonable in a normative sense, as opposed to an empirical
sense: Reasonableness is “what ought to be” rather than what
is “typical.”192 As Professor Alafair Burke commented, “absent
statistical evidence establishing the empirical reality, all decisionmakers—whether Supreme Court justices, law professors,
or jurors—are tempted to substitute their own judgment of reasonableness both for the majority’s and for what is normatively
‘right.’”193
To summarize at the risk of oversimplifying:
Status of the Reasonable or Objective Observer
Case

Effect or Endorsement

Government Purpose

Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984)

Justice O’Connor concurs,
introducing the endorsement
test, focusing on the “objective meaning of the statement
in the community.”

In the endorsement test, the
reasonable observer does not
evaluate actual government
purpose.

Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38 (1985)

Justice O’Connor concurs,
focusing on “whether the
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a
state endorsement” of religion.

Justice O’Connor agrees with
the Court that an impermissible actual government purpose motivated the
government action.

County of
Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S.

A majority of the Court asks
whether the government
action creates an apparent

In her concurrence, Justice
O’Connor advances the endorsement test and considers

190. Id. at 2758.
191. In particular, Justice Scalia contended that the reasonable observer likely
would not have known about the counties’ resolutions authorizing the first two
displays, so the counties’ failure to rescind those resolutions would make no
difference to the reasonable observer. Id. at 2758–59.
192. See Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1043, 1052 (2005).
193. Id.
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573 (1989)

endorsement of religion, but
does not yet employ the reasonable or objective observer.

the apparent government
purpose (not actual purpose)
as one aspect of that test.

Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Board v.
Pinette, 515
U.S. 753 (1995)

A majority of the court accepts a, if not the, reasonable
observer. Justices Souter and
Breyer join Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence
promoting the reasonable
observer. Justice Stevens
applies the reasonable observer but reaches a different
result.

Justice O’Connor’s concurrence acknowledges actual
purpose and effect as distinct
inquiries.

Santa Fe
Independent
School
District v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290
(2000)

The Court evaluates whether
the reasonable observer
(here, an objective high
school student at that school)
would perceive an endorsement of religion.

The Court separately considers whether the policy was
motivated by an impermissible purpose of advancing religion.

Zelman v.
SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S.
639 (2002)

The Court accepts the reasonable observer in the form
of an adult community
member.

The Court briefly evaluates
whether the government was
motivated by a secular purpose.

Elk Grove Unified School
District v.
Newdow, 542
U.S. 961 (2004)

Justice O’Connor’s concurrence summarizes the reasonable observer as “fully
cognizant of the history,
ubiquity, and context of the
practice in question.”

Justice O’Connor’s concurrence does not delve into purpose.

McCreary
County v.
ACLU, 125 S.
Ct. 2722 (2005)

The Court imports the objective, reasonable observer from the
effects-endorsement analysis into the government purpose
inquiry. For the first time, it asks whether an objective observer
would perceive that the government had an impermissible
motive rather than focusing from its own perspective on
whether the government had an actual impermissible motive.
The Court frames its inquiry as a government purpose analysis, not an effects-endorsement analysis.

Thus, the Court now has adopted the perspective of the reasonable observer to evaluate not only whether a statute or policy has the effect of creating an apparent endorsement of
religion, but also whether that statute or policy was motivated
by an impermissible government purpose.
D.

Establishment Clause Considerations in Public School
Curricular Debates

The Court has made clear that Establishment Clause doctrine
is not beholden to the Lemon test, and it has at times disre-
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garded that test in its entirety.194 Before turning to an exploration of the impact of Lemon-like McCreary County on the evolution-intelligent design debates, it is necessary to examine why a
court is likely to apply McCreary County in these situations and
also why Van Orden is likely to have little impact.195
First, when the Court last considered a case involving religion in the curriculum—in its 1987 decision in Edwards v. Aguillard—it explored the government purpose in depth, ultimately
concluding the stated secular purpose was a “sham” intended
to conceal the religious purpose motivating the policy.196 Edwards is one of only five Supreme Court cases in which an impermissible government purpose invalidated the state statute
at issue.197 Edwards did not rely on a reasonable observer, and
even if the Court had performed an effects analysis, it probably
would not have employed an endorsement analysis because a
majority of the Court did not accept that approach at the
time.198 Thus, although McCreary County is the latest in the line
of cases to invoke the concept of endorsement, it differs significantly from its predecessors because it blurs the line between
purpose and effect. As already discussed, McCreary County reshapes the government purpose analysis in light of a reasonable observer’s perceptions.199 With its intense focus on

194. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion).
195. Although the district court in the Dover, Pennsylvania case considered
McCreary County, it viewed that case as employing the reasonable observer only
as part of an endorsement analysis—not as the driving force in the government
purpose analysis. The same court did not consider Van Orden. See Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (setting up the
analytical framework for the opinion); id. at 716–35 (employing the endorsement
test with the aid of the reasonable observer); id. at 746–65 (employing the
government purpose analysis without the aid of the reasonable observer).
As noted earlier, intelligent design cases will likely be controlled by the legal
issues of government purpose, effect, endorsement, and coercion. This Article is
limited to an exacting analysis of government purpose and effect. See supra Part
III.D.
196. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The Court did not reach the merits in Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 961 (2004), which involved the daily recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance in public schools. The opinions of several justices indicate
that Elk Grove would have been decided on much the same basis as Van Orden,
because the secular cultural significance of the text “under God” has eclipsed its
religious nature and thus a searching inquiry into government purpose is
unnecessary.
197. See supra Part III.A.
198. See supra Parts III.B.2–3.
199. See supra notes 172–93 and accompanying text.

No. 2]

The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates

463

discerning government purpose, McCreary County is Edwards’
logical successor.
Second, the Court’s opinions over time emphasize the sensitivity with which lower courts should evaluate Establishment
Clause questions affecting public elementary and secondary
school students. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in
Van Orden takes care to distinguish itself from the line of Establishment Clause cases arising out of educational settings. Van
Orden reiterates the instruction in Edwards that the Court has
been and should continue to be “particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary
and secondary schools” because “particular concerns . . . arise
in [that] context.”200 Thus, courts are likely as a general matter
to apply a more, rather than less, demanding test to situations
involving public schoolchildren.201 Even though McCreary
County reins in a government purpose analysis somewhat by
limiting the review to the perspective of the reasonable observer, the McCreary County standard is still more exacting than
a test that asks only whether the state actor has coerced individual religious belief or practice,202 or whether the religious
nature of a statement has dissipated sufficiently over time to
permit its display given the independent secular value of the
statement.203
Third, a school curriculum is by its nature coercive, another
factor making an in-depth analysis of government purpose appropriate in that context.204 Although students are not forced to
believe what they are taught in school, courts have long acknowledged that the explicit purposes of public education include developing good citizens and perpetuating a common
culture and set of beliefs.205 In contrast, Van Orden is the latest
in a line of cases to hold that a noncoercive acknowledgement
of this country’s Judeo-Christian heritage does not violate the

200. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2863–64 (2005) (plurality) (quoting
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584–85).
201. See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF
LAW 137 (2005).
202. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
203. See, e.g., Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
204. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
205. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 864 (1982); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943);
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).

464

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 29

Establishment Clause. Much like the language “In God We
Trust” on our nation’s currency or the sculpture of Moses with
other law-givers in the Supreme Court courtroom, the Ten
Commandments monument at issue in Van Orden is “passive.”206 As Justice Thomas elaborated in his concurrence, “In
no sense does Texas compel petitioner Van Orden to do anything. . . . He need not stop to read [the monument] or even to
look at it, let alone to express support for it or adopt the Commandments as guides for his life.”207
A school curriculum requires active engagement, and is significantly different from the passive message at issue in Van
Orden. Although students who are taught concepts such as intelligent design are not required to accept the instructional material as true, requiring belief is not the only manner in which a
school can run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Even if intelligent design is merely part of a statement read in a classroom,
as it was in Dover, Pennsylvania, students must listen to their
school officials declare intelligent design to be a valid, and perhaps preferable, scientific concept. In other words, students
must absorb a particular message about which idea they ought
to accept as true.208 Depending on the extent to which intelligent design is included in the curriculum, students could be
required to read assigned materials, develop an understanding
of the ideas presented, or demonstrate that understanding on a
class test, if not on a statewide standards-based test that could
take the form of a graduation requirement. The extent of instruction is not determinative of an Establishment Clause violation, however. As the plaintiffs’ attorney stated during the trial
of the Dover intelligent design policy, “there is no such thing as
a little constitutional violation.”209
Fourth and finally, the Court’s cases also note that the perceived endorsement of religion is weaker if the religious activity is not school-sponsored and does not occur during school

206. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion).
207. Id. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring).
208. As Professor Marci Hamilton has noted, schools’ actions have been held to
violate the Establishment Clause when “the school send[s] a rather clear message
to the students about what they should believe.” HAMILTON, supra note 201, at
137.
209. Transcript of Trial Proceeding, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 13 (plaintiffs’
opening statement).
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hours,210 does not take place on school property,211 or does not
result from a direct government-to-religiously-affiliated-school
subsidy.212 When the policy at issue involves an action occurring during the school day or at an official school event, the
Court has invalidated the policy with greater frequency.213
Given McCreary County’s merging of government purpose and
effect inquiries, these considerations (earlier only found in the
effect analysis) are now relevant to a government purpose
analysis as well. Edwards, the case involving statutorily prescribed “balanced treatment” of evolution and creationism in
the classroom, contained one of the Court’s most invasive
analyses of government purpose, perhaps second only to
McCreary County.214 Even when considering McCreary County,
the Court’s focus on government purpose seems to have had
the most significant impact in cases involving public schools.215
For these reasons, the Court’s precedent suggests that lower
courts are likely to consider McCreary County in their evaluation of government purpose in intelligent design disputes.
IV.

DON’T THROW THE BABY OUT WITH
THE MCCREARY COUNTY BATHWATER

Many aspects of the current evolution debates sound familiar, but judicial resolution of evolution-intelligent design controversies has become even more complicated because of
McCreary County’s altered focus in the realm of government
purpose. The government purpose inquiry has long been criticized by judges and scholars, but McCreary County declares de210. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (permitting a
non-school-sponsored religious organization to use school facilities after school
hours on the same terms as nonreligious organizations).
211. See generally Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), overruling Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
212. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (permitting a statesponsored program to provide qualifying parents with vouchers for private
school tuition and tutoring because of the private action necessary to use the
public funds in religious schools).
213. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that a
school district was not permitted to arrange for student-led religious prayer at
school-sponsored football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding
that a school district could not recruit a clergy person to deliver a
nondenominational prayer at middle school graduation because of the coercive
nature of the prayer).
214. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
215. See Koppelman, supra note 112, at 153–54.
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finitively that this inquiry is worth maintaining: “After declining the invitation to abandon concern with purpose wholesale,
we also have to avoid the [government’s] alternative tack of
trivializing the enquiry into it” by assuming the legitimacy of a
stated government purpose.216
This Part contends that, because McCreary County will impact
the government purpose analysis negatively if courts interpret
and apply the case as this Article argues they are bound to do,
the government purpose analysis should be preserved in its
pre-McCreary County form: as a search for actual purpose without the involvement of the reasonable observer.217 First and
most obviously, when the government purpose inquiry moves
from a search for actual purpose to speculation about apparent
purpose, the result is both over- and under-inclusive. Second,
the reasonable observer evaluating government purpose will
be required to have an unreasonably vast command of issues of
law, yet is confined by a more limited command of facts than
those to which a court is privy. Third, because the formal nature of the Court’s government purpose inquiry has moved
from finding facts to reaching legal conclusions, the appellate
standard of review will become uniformly de novo, even
though the inquiry into government purpose is an essentially
factual determination. The context of the intelligent design debates illuminates this discussion.
A.

Changing the Constitutional Harm

As the Court noted in McCreary County, the term “establishment” is not self-defining,218 and so it falls to the courts to discern the meaning of the clause and then to distinguish action or
intent that runs afoul of the Constitution from that which does
not. Because McCreary County shifts the harm from a focus on
the government’s actual purpose to its perceived purpose,219
some behavior that would have offended the Constitution before no longer does so, and vice versa. The change may be
216. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2735 (2005). For a thorough
defense of the secular purpose requirement, see id.
217. The eventual analytical result I advocate is roughly the same as the
approach recently adopted by the district court in the Dover, Pennsylvania trial.
See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 746, 747 n.20, 763
(M.D. Pa. 2005). As explained in this Part, however, McCreary County does not
support the district court’s specific approach.
218. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2742.
219. See supra Part III.C.
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small and at the margins, but it is nonetheless a change in what
constitutes a constitutional harm.
1.

What Apparent Intent Misses: Hidden Motives

Although any motive-based inquiry to some extent encourages burying improper purposes just deep enough that they
will not be discovered,220 McCreary County creates even more
hiding places for impermissible motives because of its newly
required definitional deference to apparent government purpose. The indeterminate depth of the reasonable observer’s inquiry (a problem in itself) also creates other problems: The
reasonable observer’s assumptions about intelligent design influence the scope of the inquiry, and, by relying on traditional
publicly available information (not all of which is necessarily
reliable, including newspaper articles), the reasonable observer
is shielded from important non-public information regarding
actual purpose.
McCreary County makes clear that the reasonable observer’s
impression of the apparent government purpose will depend
in part on how well an impermissible motive is hidden or,
rather, how diligently the reasonable observer—as manipulated by a court—searches for it:
If someone in the government hides religious motive so well
that the “objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,” . . . cannot
see it, then without something more the government does
not make a divisive announcement that in itself amounts to
taking religious sides. A secret motive stirs up no strife and
does nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents, and it suffices to wait and see whether such government action turns
out to have (as it may even be likely to have) the illegitimate
effect of advancing religion.221

The Court implies that this level of inquiry is no different than
before, but the focus of the analysis, and of the harm, has
shifted.222 The Court is so unconcerned with rooting out an actual impermissible purpose that it blithely suggests that if an
impermissible government purpose escapes notice, then an effects-endorsement analysis will probably function as a sufficient safety net. Evaluating only perceived purpose will
220. See Smith, supra note 130, at 284.
221. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2735 (citations omitted).
222. See supra notes 180–87 and accompanying text.
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absolve government actors if their attempts to act unconstitutionally are concealed just carefully enough and do not achieve
the desired effect. This could happen anyway with an actual
purpose analysis, but there is a significant difference between
unconstitutional behavior escaping censure because of a systemic error and the same behavior being permitted in the first
instance.
As explained earlier, intelligent design is presented as a scientific theory, and its adherents speak reverently of its secular
nature; some even state that the intelligent designer to whom
all credit is given could be an alien life form.223 Intelligent design proponents present themselves as promoting their ideas
for the secular purposes of fostering critical thinking, religious
neutrality, and academic freedom.224 Although some intelligent
design proponents admit an overtly religious motivation for
their ideas, most do not.225 Thus, if a religious motive is present
in an intelligent-design-friendly policy or statute, as intelligent
design’s critics routinely presume,226 that motive is likely to be
at least partially hidden. Accordingly, if the reasonable observer evaluating an intelligent design policy considers a stated
secular primary government purpose and cursorily evaluates
the context and legislative history of a questioned action, the
government purpose inquiry easily could end there, with a determination that an intelligent design policy does not violate
the Establishment Clause. If the reasonable observer is aware
either of Christian fundamentalists’ and creationists’ “typical
opinion” of evolution227 or of the religious motivation of many
involved in the intelligent design movement, though, the reasonable observer might probe the government’s apparent purpose further, given that the only limits on an objective,
reasonable observer are those set by the guiding court. However, the reasonable observer does not have to do so, and the
level of invasiveness in its inquiry is unpredictable. This demonstrates the primary malignancy in McCreary County: The decision creates a reasonable observer whose form and function
223. See Calvert, supra note 15, at 4, 8 n.9; Ratliff, supra note 82.
224. See supra Part II.A.3.
225. See supra notes 75–88 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Mackenzie, supra note 10; Ratliff, supra note 82; Media Matters for
America, supra note 67.
227. A reasonable observer in the Northern District of Georgia recently was so
aware. See Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1308 (N.D. Ga.
2005).
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are unprecedentedly malleable, and thus dangerously uncertain.
Whether the reasonable observer is a more or less aggressive
investigator of apparent purpose, an ultimate search for actual
purpose should not be the focus of a court’s analysis after
McCreary County, as the constitutional harm now follows the
public appearance of impropriety.228 The recent trial involving
the Dover, Pennsylvania school district’s intelligent design policy illustrates various difficulties resulting from the reasonable
observer’s consideration of formal proffered purpose, as well
as government actors’ public statements. At trial, the school
district argued that it adopted the policy because it intended to
“promote[] critical thinking” by enhancing students’ understanding of the theory of evolution.229 The plaintiffs, however,
presented evidence that the most infamous board member
made statements at school board meetings referring to a science textbook being “laced with Darwinism,” declaring
“[n]owhere in the Constitution does it call for a separation of
church and state,” and posing the rhetorical question, “Two
thousand years ago, someone died on a cross; [c]an’t someone
take a stand for him?”230 Based in part on these comments as
well as various school board members’ reported references to
“creationism” during board meetings in the months preceding
the adoption of the intelligent design policy, the plaintiffs argued that school board members adopted the policy for the
purpose of infusing religion into the Dover schools.231
Publicly declared and reported statements such as these constitute the traditional type—and arguably the full extent—of
information about motive to which a reasonable observer presumably would be privy.232 Yet as the Dover trial made clear,
when the accuracy of newspaper accounts is called into question, the reasonable observer’s role is complicated further.
228. See supra notes 174–77, 181–82 and accompanying text.
229. Transcript of Trial Proceeding, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 21–24; Martha
Raffaele, Board Member Testifies in Evolution Case, GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2005, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uslatest/story/0,1282,-5383711,00.html.
230. Coyne, supra note 3, at 21.
231. See, e.g., Complaint at 18, Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (No. 4:04-CV002688); Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 25–26,
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (No. 4:04-CV-002688); see also Lauri Lebo,
Depositions Refer to Creationism, YORK DAILY REC., Aug. 10, 2005, at C1.
232. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714–15 (M.D.
Pa. 2005). See also supra notes 130, 141, 147–49, 158–62, 177, 227 and accompanying
text.
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School board members testified that two newspaper articles
incorrectly reported board members to have used the word
“creationism” when discussing science instruction during a
June 2004 board meeting, just four months before the board
adopted the intelligent design policy.233 Because the school district’s audio recording of the meeting in question disappeared
before discovery began, the reporters who wrote the articles
were subpoenaed; they testified in depositions and in court
that their articles accurately reflected board members’ use of
the word “creationism.”234 Ultimately, the district court found
that the articles accurately reflected what transpired at the
board meeting.235 Under McCreary County, because the court
found the articles accurate, that finding would likely comport
with a reasonable observer’s presumption. If the court had
found the board members’ denials correct, though, then a reasonable observer also would have been presumed to doubt the
accuracy of the newspaper accounts without any apparent reason to do so, as no board member requested a retraction of either article.
In the Dover trial, less controversy existed about the validity
of other public statements, and depending on the number of
board members and administrators who publicly expressed the
following types of sentiments, the evidence might or might not
be sufficient to create an apparent impermissible government
purpose. One school board member’s June 2004 letter to the
editor regarding the intelligent design controversy stated, “You
can teach creationism without it being Christianity. It’s just a
higher power.”236 Another school board member stated in a
television interview around the same time that he supported
balancing the teaching of evolution with something “such as
creationism.”237 Nonetheless, the Dover trial also demonstrates
that the reasonable observer would not have a full picture of
government purpose without a more searching factual inquiry
233. Transcript of Trial Proceeding, supra note 1, Day 16 PM, at 5; id., Day 16
PM, at 12; see also Lauri Lebo, Judge Grills Dover Official, YORK DAILY REC., Nov. 1,
2005, at A1; Lauri Lebo, Nilsen Shrugged Off Principal, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 22,
2005, at A1.
234. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 2 PM, at 79–81; id., Day
17, at 24–29.
235. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 751–55.
236. Heather Geesey, Letter to the Editor, Textbook Quest Explained, YORK DAILY
REC., June 27, 2004, at B6.
237. Dover Biology TV Clip (Fox43 television broadcast June 2004), available at
http://www.ydr.com/mmedia/multi/528.

No. 2]

The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates

471

into board members’ and administrators’ non-public statements. First, the intelligent design policy was not adopted until
October 2004, but the Dover superintendent’s notes from January 2002 and March 2003 reflect a school board member’s repeated discussion of “creationism” at school board retreats.238
Second, approximately a year and a half before the intelligent
design policy was adopted, the school district’s assistant superintendent told the chairperson of the Dover high school science
department that a school board member “wanted half the evolution unit devoted to ‘creationism.’”239 Third, the assistant superintendent drafted changes to the biology curriculum using
the word “creationism,” a term eventually replaced by “intelligent design” before the board adopted the policy (though a
board member referred to the policy as referencing “creationism” after the policy was adopted).240 Fourth, the school board
policy referred students to the early intelligent design reference
book Of Pandas and People, a book with strong roots in creationism.241 Fifth, the school district surreptitiously received two
classroom sets of this book (sixty copies in all) because one
school board member raised money to purchase the copies by
soliciting cash donations at his church, and then wrote a personal check for the collected amount so that the father of another board member could purchase and donate the books.242
These five examples (and others considered by the district
court)243 certainly seem to be important clues about government intent, yet they are clues from which the reasonable observer should be shielded because of the non-public nature of
the statements. The Dover plaintiffs likely could have won
their case based on publicly available information alone, with-

238. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 13 PM, at 6–7; Lebo,
Nilsen Shrugged off Principal, supra note 233.
239. Lebo, supra note 231; see also Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1,
Day 1 AM, at 7.
240. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 7–8.
241. Id., Day 6 AM, at 118–26.
242. Both board members denied these actions in their January 2005 depositions
but admitted their involvement with the book donation while testifying at trial in
October 2005. Attempting to reconcile this inconsistency, the board member who
solicited contributions tried to parse the language of his solicitation and later
claimed to have a poor memory because of his addiction to the painkiller
OxyContin. Michelle Starr, Buckingham Contradicts Self on Money for Books, YORK
DAILY REC., Oct. 28, 2005, at A1.
243. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 748–50, 752–61
(M.D. Pa. 2005).
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out need for a more demanding purpose inquiry. But, based on
the situation in Dover, it is not difficult to imagine a similar
situation in which some or all school board members and district administrators are more savvy, and secret away religious
purpose more effectively behind closed doors.
Thus, when moving backwards from a searching analysis of
actual purpose to a less demanding inquiry into apparent purpose, courts must shield the reasonable observer from important information about motive to preserve the integrity of the
reasonable observer’s analysis. Government officials should
not be able to enact laws or policies that violate their oaths of
office in which they swear to uphold the Constitution of the
United States merely because their covert intent to act unconstitutionally was not followed by the desired effect. This, however, is what McCreary County may permit.
2.

Increasing Problems with “Neutrality”

Relying on the reasonable observer’s perspective creates the
challenge of trying to fashion a “neutral” or “objective” frame
of reference for the reasonable observer.244 Additional problems
arise when the reasonable observer, no longer merely opining
about a statute or policy’s effect, must speculate about government intent from some ill-defined position of “neutrality,” a
seemingly specific perspective that is not easily agreed upon in
an intelligent design dispute.
The Court’s reasonable observers, previously arbiters of effect and endorsement, traditionally have not been representative of minority religious groups which may take more serious
offense at public expressions of Judeo-Christian religious traditions.245 Presumably, then, the Establishment Clause’s reasonable observer has viewed the world through some sort of
Judeo-Christian lens when evaluating a statute or policy’s effect,246 and will continue to do so when evaluating apparent
government purpose. However, it is unclear how a reasonable
observer should view the intelligent design debate. With the
country fairly evenly divided about such contentious issues as
244. See supra notes 139–40, 150, 163 and accompanying text.
245. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
195, 216 (1992); Anjali Sakaria, Note, Worshipping Substantive Equality over Formal
Neutrality: Applying the Endorsement Test to Sect-Specific Legislative Accommodations,
37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 493 (2002).
246. See Sakaria, supra note 245, at 493.
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whether the existence of life and the diversity of species are
attributable primarily to natural forces or to specific divine intervention, but not split along the lines of traditional majority
and minority religious groups, it is difficult to imagine a “neutral” perspective from which the reasonable observer might
operate.247
Perhaps a reasonable observer is required to have no opinion
about the validity of the theory of evolution or the concept of
intelligent design. Under this characterization, a truly neutral
reasonable observer should lack knowledge of religion and
thus not subscribe to any particular sectarian or secular perspective. Yet, the reasonable observer reflects the community
and, as such, is not a tabula rasa.248 Moreover, a “reasonable
observer as blank slate” approach would strain the reasonable
observer’s legitimacy, as the reasonable observer would be rejected by nearly all scientists for a failure to discard the concept
of intelligent design and by intelligent design advocates for a
failure to reject evolution. Furthermore, such a person either
would be so apathetic as not to care enough to form an opinion
about one of the questions most fundamental to human existence, or would lack the judgment to evaluate the scientific research. Neither option fits with the Court’s model of a nearly
omniscient reasonable observer. The reasonable observer is not
constrained by typicality, but arguably is reined in by courts’
need for analytical legitimacy.
Presuming that some bias is inevitable in an intelligent design case, whether directly on the part of the reasonable observer or indirectly through the court, perhaps the goal should
be to have a reasonable observer who is fair, able to recognize
personal bias, and more aware of ascribing a motive to government actors based on those assumptions. Again, the problem of the reasonable observer’s neutrality is even more
difficult in the context of government purpose than in the effects-endorsement analysis because when viewing an effect, it
is easier to distance oneself from personal bias. When making a
judgment about covert intent, disentangling personal bias is
much more difficult because of the necessity of ascribing some
state of mind to the actor rather than dispassionately observing
effects.

247. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Parts III.B.3–4.
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Apparent Intent’s Potential for Overreaching

Finally, these difficulties demonstrate that a focus on perceived government purpose may crucify government actors for
apparently acting with an unconstitutional purpose in the absence of an actual intent. Justice Scalia expressed this concern
in his McCreary County dissent.249 Striking down a statute or
policy based on unconstitutional motive impugns “not only the
legislators’ motives but also their honesty.”250 When based on
mere apparent purpose, this action could undermine a branch
of government without sufficient justification. A court’s ability
to determine that a statute or policy violates a state or federal
constitution is a core aspect of our system of government in
which the three branches exert their checks and balances upon
one another. For a court to strike down an intelligent design
policy or statute as motivated by an impermissible government
purpose, that court should base its decision on an exacting
analysis necessarily, and uniformly, deeper than the reasonable
observer’s mere perceptions.
In the intelligent design context, the nearly omniscient reasonable observer could be so skeptical of intelligent design’s
recent and present links to religion251 that the reasonable observer would be unable to imagine any primary secular purpose for teaching intelligent design as valid science. Given the
increasingly mutable nature of the reasonable observer, this is
certainly possible and would lead to the conclusion that a
school board had an obvious, apparent purpose of advancing
religion by promoting the instruction of intelligent design. Indeed, the district court in the Dover, Pennsylvania case determined that “an objective observer would know that [intelligent
design] and teaching about ‘gaps’ and ‘problems’ in evolutionary theory are creationist, religious strategies that evolved from
earlier forms of creationism.”252
Yet it is possible that the government actors’ actual purpose
could be at odds with this apparent purpose: that school board
members could be, in good faith, swayed not by religion, but
249. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2757 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
250. Smith, supra note 130, at 286.
251. For a chronology of the intelligent design movement, and exploration of its
creationist roots in particular, see the Kitzmiller trial testimony of Dr. Barbara
Forrest. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 6 AM, at 117–26.
252. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 716 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
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by technical, seemingly complex discussions of bacterial flagella and blood clotting systems such as those introduced by
intelligent design proponent Michael Behe.253 Similarly, as apparently happened in Dover, one or more board members
could defer to other board members’ judgments that intelligent
design is a credible scientific theory and teaching it promotes
critical thinking, voting for an intelligent design policy without
conducting any independent research on intelligent design
whatsoever.254
None of this is intended to imply that a court cannot control
the reasonable observer inquiry, or that it will employ such an
analysis in a haphazard manner without regard for reaching a
defensible conclusion. Rather, the reasonable observer analysis
requires a review one step removed from the perspective of the
court.255 The intelligent design debates are so politically heated
and religiously charged that each player questions the credibility and motive of all other players.256 Thus, courts’ decisions
serve not only the traditional function of resolving legal debates, but also the social function of giving legitimacy to the
prevailing party in a manner that does not weaken the court’s
own authority. In the intelligent design context, this will be exceptionally difficult because, if McCreary County is strictly applied, a purportedly neutral reasonable observer will draw
conclusions about governmental intent based on necessarily
incomplete factual information and a nearly omniscient perspective on issues of law. These challenges weaken the court’s
ability to render a credible decision and highlight the difficulties that occur when the inquiry into government purpose is
effectively curtailed. Thus, when questioning legislators’ motives, an actual purpose analysis is indispensable. For all these
reasons, the shift in constitutional harm from actual to apparent government purpose is inherently problematic.

253. See Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 11 AM, at 4–30.
254. See id., Day 6 AM, at 117–26.
255. See supra notes 135–36, 150–52, 162, 194–96 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. See also Transcript of Trial
Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 10 AM, at 89–90 (discussing Dr. Kenneth Miller’s
critique of Dr. Michael Behe’s irreducible complexity concept).
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B. What Did the Reasonable Observer Know,
and When Did the Reasonable Observer Know It?
After McCreary County, the legal fiction of the reasonable observer takes center stage in the government purpose inquiry.
As such, what the reasonable observer is presumed to know
becomes even more important in an Establishment Clause case
such as an intelligent design dispute. Although the reasonable
observer’s factual knowledge of context will necessarily be limited, imputing the requisite legal knowledge to the reasonable
observer will result in the most bizarrely ultra-knowledgeable
reasonable observers to date. One issue in particular brings this
into focus: In various ways over the past four years, intelligent
design advocates have asserted that the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001 (NCLB) supports, if not requires, the teaching of
intelligent design.257 In 2005, this argument was made extensively during the Kansas Board of Education’s consideration of
proposed revisions to state science standards and briefly during the Dover trial.258
The extent of the reasonable observer’s necessary knowledge
of issues of law will be enumerated momentarily. Bear in mind
that throughout the reasonable observer’s existence in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, there is little the reasonable observer has been presumed not to know about social practices or
legal requirements.
1.

NCLB’s Requirements, or Lack Thereof

Let us assume that a state or local board of education relied
on advice such as that given by Intelligent Design Network cofounder and Missouri attorney John Calvert, and mandated
teaching of intelligent design with the stated purpose of compliance with NCLB. Parents of affected schoolchildren would
bring a lawsuit asserting that the new state standard or local
school board policy violates the Establishment Clause, and one
of the first questions a trial court would face is whether a reasonable observer would perceive that the government’s apparent purpose was to endorse religion or to act with hostility
toward religion. To evaluate whether the stated government
purpose is a sham, the reasonable observer will need to assess

257. See Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 24–25 (defendant’s opening statement); Calvert, supra note 75, at 5–7.
258. See Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 24–25.
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the legitimacy of the government’s proffered purpose (in other
words, whether NCLB requires what the state actor says it
does), and the government’s apparent confidence in that purpose (whether the government actor appeared to know that it
was relying on bad advice, which is in part dependent on
whether a government actor should have known what the law
requires).259 Therefore, the reasonable observer will need
knowledge of NCLB that almost certainly exceeds that of
nearly all state and local school boards in the country. The reasonable observer will know the following:
In January 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 670 pages in its final
form. NCLB defines science as a “core academic subject.”260 It
requires states to adopt science standards by the 2005–2006
school year, and to begin testing student science achievement
by the 2007–2008 school year.261 Aside from these general requirements, few provisions of NCLB relate to science instruction.262 Over the past four years, intelligent design advocates
259. See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
260. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, § 9101(d)(11), Pub. L. No. 107-10, 115
Stat. 1425, 1958 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter NCLB].
261. NCLB § 1111(b)(1)(C) (adoption of standards); § 1111(b)(3)(C)(v)(ii) (science
testing must occur once in grades 3–5, grades 6–9, and grades 10–12). Although
NCLB contains strict sanctions for schools in which any subgroup of students fails
to make adequate yearly progress in reading or math achievement, there are no
statutory sanctions for low performance on science tests.
262. This is in direct contrast to NCLB’s extensive focus on reading and math
instruction. Although the sanctions for low performance on reading and math
tests are severe, there are no sanctions for low performance on science tests. The
“highly qualified teacher” provisions of NCLB apply to science teachers, although
NCLB does not single out science teachers. All teachers hired after January 8,
2002, the effective date of NCLB, must be “highly qualified” at the time of hiring:
In other words, certified by the state to teach in a particular area. Id. § 1119(a)(1).
Further, all teachers of core subjects (including science) must become highly
qualified by the 2005–2006 school year. Id. § 1119(a)(2).
In other provisions related to science education, NCLB requires that the
National Assessment of Educational Progress test students’ science achievement.
Id. § 602. It also permits the troops-to-teachers program to help address the
nationwide shortage of science teachers. Id. §§ 2301–2307. Finally, it creates
programs to encourage science education; e.g., § 1705(c)(4) (developing advanced
placement science programs); § 2113(c)(3) (designing alternative certification for
science teachers); § 2113(c)(12) (instituting merit-based pay and financial
incentives for science teachers); §§ 2201–2203 (creating partnerships between
public schools and institutes of higher education to train science teachers and
develop science curricula); § 4205(a)(2) (including science instruction in 21st
Century Community Learning Centers); §§ 5701–5311 (encouraging science
instruction in the Magnet Schools Assistance Program); §§ 5471–5477 (recognizing
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have mistakenly claimed that three aspects of NCLB support
teaching intelligent design: a sense of the Senate amendment
that was not part of the final legislation, the non-binding conference committee report, and NCLB’s requirements that supplemental education services and nationally standardized
testing be conducted in a “secular, neutral, non-ideological”
manner. 263
2.

The Santorum Amendment

The first point of confusion has its genesis in an amendment
Senator Rick Santorum introduced when NCLB was first before
the Senate:
It is the sense of the Senate that—(1) good science education
should prepare students to distinguish the data or testable
theories of science from philosophical or religious claims
that are made in the name of science; and (2) where biological evolution is taught, the curriculum should help students
to understand why this subject generates so much continuing controversy, and should prepare the students to be informed participants in public discussions regarding the
subject.264

After brief debate, the amendment passed by a vote of 91-8 and
became part of the initial bill adopted by the Senate.265 The
science instruction achievement in the Star Schools Program); §§ 5611–5618
(noting participation rates of girls and women in science programs in the
Women’s Educational Equity Act); § 7121 (Improvement of Education
Opportunities for Indian Children); § 7134 (Gifted and Talented Indian Students);
§ 7205(3)(F) (science programs for gifted and talented native Hawaiian students);
§ 7304(2)(F) (science programs for native Alaskan students). This footnote
contains a comprehensive listing of all science-related provisions contained in
NCLB.
263. For a general discussion of NCLB’s requirements regarding science and the
Santorum Amendment in particular, see Wexler, supra note 45, at 835–40.
264. 147 CONG. REC. S6147–48 (daily ed. June 13, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Santorum).
265. 147 CONG. REC. S6153 (daily ed. June 13, 2001). The eight Senators voting in
opposition may have done so out of concern for federal intrusion into a matter of
local control rather than based on an understanding of the religious overtone of
the amendment. See Larry Witham, Senate Bill Tackles Evolution Debate, WASH.
TIMES, June 18, 2001, at A4. The National Center for Science Education speculated,
“[I]t seems likely that most of the Senators who voted for the bill were unaware of
[its] anti-evolution implications.” Glenn Branch, NCSE Office Manager, Nat’l Ctr.
For Science Educ., Farewell to the Santorum Amendment?, http://www.ncseweb.org/
resources/rncse_content/vol22/283_farewell_to_the_santorum_amend_12_30_1899.asp
(last visited Jan. 17, 2006). Interestingly, Senator Robert Byrd and Senator Edward
Kennedy spoke in favor of a “teach the controversy” approach regarding
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Santorum Amendment was not included in the final text of the
legislation, however.266 In the four years since NCLB was
signed into law, misleading information about the Santorum
Amendment has been circulated repeatedly. In spring 2002,
Senator Santorum, Ohio Representatives John Boehner and
Steve Chabot, and others made prominent public statements
that the Santorum Amendment had become law.267 Two years
later, in the introduction to his 2004 book Uncommon Dissent:
Intellectuals Who Find Darwinism Unconvincing, Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary professor William Dembski reprinted the
Santorum Amendment, noting the vote by which it passed the
Senate without mentioning that the amendment failed to become law.268 Most recently, during opening statements in the
trial of the Dover, Pennsylvania intelligent design policy in
September 2005, the school district’s attorney referred to the
Santorum Amendment as though it was part of NCLB and thus

evolution, suggesting their lack of awareness of the amendment’s potential
effects. 147 CONG. REC. S6150, S6152 (daily ed. June 13, 2001) (statements of Sen.
Kennedy and Sen. Byrd).
266. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Miller, Professor of Biology, Brown Univ., The Truth
About the “Santorum Amendment” Language on Evolution, http://www.millerand
levine.com/km/evol/santorum.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2006); Intelligent Design
and Evolution Awareness Center, U.S. Senate Passes Santorum Amendment,
Supports Critical Thinking Regarding Evolutionary Theory: ***Santorum
Amendment Update***, http://www.ideacenter.org/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/
1195 (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
267. For example, in an editorial, Senator Santorum asserted that his
amendment was a “provision” of the newly enacted NCLB. Rick Santorum,
Illiberal Education in Ohio Schools, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A14.
Approximately one week later, the Washington Times quoted Ohio Representatives
John Boehner and Steve Chabot stating the same contention. Greg Pierce, State of
Hysteria, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at A05. When testifying before the Ohio
State Board of Education in the March 6, 2002 hearings regarding proposed
revisions to Ohio Science Standards, Steven Meyer of the Discovery Institute also
stated that the Santorum Amendment had become law. See Stephen C. Meyer,
Discovery News Institute, Teach the Controversy (March 30, 2002), http://www.
discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=1134; see also David
J. Hoff, And Congress Said, Let There Be Other Views. Or Did It?, EDUC. WEEK, June
12, 2002, at 28.
Recently, Senator Santorum stated on NPR that “[a]s far as intelligent design is
concerned, I really don’t believe it has risen to the level of a scientific theory at this
point that we would want to teach it alongside of evolution.” Lauri Lebo, Senator
Recasts Science Stance, YORK DAILY REC., Aug. 5, 2005, at A1.
268. See William Dembski, Introduction: The Myths of Darwinism, in UNCOMMON
DISSENT: INTELLECTUALS WHO FIND DARWINISM UNCONVINCING xix (William A.
Dembski ed. 2004).
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binding law.269 The reasonable observer, of course, would not
be misled by any of this, and at this point in time, neither
should a local school board, state board of education, or state
legislature.
3.

Conference Committee Report Language

The second point of confusion comes from the nearly 400page Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference (the conference committee report submitted to both houses
with the final legislation), which echoed the sentiment of the
Santorum Amendment:
The Conferees recognize that a quality science education
should prepare students to distinguish the data and testable
theories of science from religious or philosophical claims
that are made in the name of science. Where topics are
taught that may generate controversy (such as biological
evolution), the curriculum should help students to understand the full range of scientific views that exist, why such
topics may generate controversy, and how scientific discoveries can profoundly affect society.270

Normally, conference committee report language would be
relevant as part of a statute’s legislative history; however, it is
unclear how much, if any, weight should be given to the already non-binding271 “teach the controversy” language of the
conference committee report, given both the enormity of this
legislation and the absence of any corresponding statutory
provision for the report language quoted above.272 The March
2004 opinion letter to the Darby, Montana school board from
attorney John Calvert suggests the conference committee report
deserves significant deference:

269. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 24–25
(defendant’s opening statement); id., Day 6 PM, at 83 (cross-examination of
Barbara Forrest during which counsel for the school district clarified that the
Santorum Amendment is not part of NCLB).
270. H.R. REP. NO. 107-334, at 78 (2001) (Conf. Rep.). This language comes from
the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, which was
included in the Conference Committee Report.
271. See Wexler, supra note 45, at 766.
272. Thus, the language would not even seem to garner the attention of a court
interpreting the statute. See FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM, & PUBLIC
EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT
DESIGN xxi (2003).
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The legislative history of No Child Left Behind also makes it
clear that Congress considers evolution to be a controversial
theory that should be taught objectively. This is evident
from the [conference committee report]. . . . Clearly an official policy that censors or downplays scientific criticisms of
“biological evolution” and that does not permit discussion
of alternative scientific views is contradictory to this advice . . . .273

At best, Calvert overstates the binding nature of the conference
committee report. At worst, that portion of his legal advice is
simply wrong. Regardless, a reasonable observer would know
that the language is not binding and would consider that
knowledge of the law as part of the background for an evaluation of government purpose.
4.

The “Secular, Neutral, and Nonideological” Directives

The third point of confusion is, to be fair, a more complicated
argument. Calvert and the authors of the March 2005 Kansas
Science Standards Committee Minority Report contend that
NCLB’s repeated use of the phrase “secular, neutral and nonideological” creates a statutory requirement that evolution be
taught critically, if not accompanied by the concept of intelligent design outright.274 The Minority Report points to two provisions: First, NCLB requires the standardized National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) to be “free from racial, cultural, gender, or regional bias, and . . . secular, neutral, and
nonideological.”275 The NAEP is not directly related to local
school districts’ curricular choices, however. It is a nationally
standardized test administered to sample groups of fourth,
273. Calvert, supra note 75, at 6–7 (citations omitted).
274. Id. at 5.
275. NCLB § 412(e)(4), Pub. L. No. 107-10, 115 Stat. 1425, 1906 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (amending the National Education Statistics Act of
1994). The Department of Education uses NAEP data as a check on states’ reports
regarding their own student achievement, but even David Winick, Chairperson of the
National Assessment Governing Board, notes that the NAEP and NCLB tests have
different purposes and are not interchangeable. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Science
Assessment Meeting Proceedings (June 18–19, 2004), http://www.ed.gov/
rschstat/research/progs/mathscience/science-assessment/proceedings.pdf. Although
NCLB focuses on states’ establishing their own curricular standards and testing
students’ achievement towards those state standards, it has been clear from the
beginning that states’ performance on NAEP tests does not track with states’
performance on their own standards-based tests. Rand Education, Research Brief:
Meeting Literacy Goals Stated by NCLB (2005), http://www.rand.org/publications/
RB/RB9081-1/.
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eighth, and twelfth grade students across the country each
year. The NAEP tracks student achievement in eleven subject
areas, including science. Resulting data is disaggregated by
such factors as sex and racial or ethnic group, but it is not reported by school or district and is only occasionally reported
by state.276 The science test was given in 2000 and again in
spring 2005; it is not scheduled to be given again until 2009.277
Although the NAEP evaluates students’ acquisition of scientific
knowledge and reasoning, several inferential leaps are required to move from the NCLB requirement, to confidential
NAEP questions, to state science standards, to mandatory inclusion of intelligent design in a school district’s curriculum.
Second, the Minority Report notes that NCLB requires supplemental service providers, usually organizations providing
tutoring to children in failing schools, to provide academic content and instruction that are “secular, neutral and nonideological.”278 This provision has no bearing on states’ and school
districts’ decisions regarding the teaching of evolution. Rather,
it opens the door for religiously affiliated organizations and
parochial schools to qualify as supplemental service providers
so long as they do not engage in religious instruction while delivering the educational services for which they are receiving
federal funds. The remaining statutory provisions using the
phrase “secular, neutral and nonideological” are triggered
when private schools receive NCLB funds and, similarly, have
no connection to local school district curricula.279
276. See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, NAEP Overview, http://nces.ed.gov/
nationsreportcard/about/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
277. Results from the 2005 NAEP are expected in Spring 2006. See id.
278. NCLB § 1116(e)(5)(D).
279. For example, NCLB requires that private schools receiving subsidies for
special education services or other benefits (materials and equipment) guarantee
to the state or local education agency that the funds will only be used in a manner
that is “secular, neutral and nonideological.” § 1120(a)(2). Additionally, NCLB
also permits public funds to be used for professional development of private
school teachers who teach English language learning students. In that context,
states must assure the federal government that local education agencies provide
services, materials and equipment to private school non-English speaking
students in a manner that is “secular, neutral and nonideological.” § 3245(a)(7)(A).
Further, NCLB makes funding available for innovative educational programs.
States can apply for these funds to redevelop state curricular standards, create
new student and school district assessments, encourage charter schools, and
initiate other statewide education reforms. School districts can use these funds to
develop gifted and talented programs, magnet schools and charter schools, adult
literacy initiatives, professional development opportunities, alternative education
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What Is a Reasonable Observer to Do?

All of the foregoing is the legal background a reasonable observer must have to properly evaluate the accuracy of a state or
local school board’s statement that its purpose in requiring
teaching of intelligent design is to comply with the spirit or letter of NCLB. The reasonable observer’s job is not done, however, after determining that there is no such statutory or
regulatory requirement. The next question in the government
purpose analysis is whether, based on a reasonable observer’s
analysis of public statements and other readily available information,280 the school board appeared to accept a materially inaccurate characterization of NCLB, or whether it questioned
the unsound advice yet acted on it anyway. Several more problems become obvious at this point.
First, a school board’s unquestioning reliance on bad legal
advice would seem to help immunize it from an Establishment
Clause violation from the perspective of a reasonable observer,
a result that would encourage school boards to silence their
questions about church-state conflict and instead maintain ignorance. Because an apparent purpose analysis is necessarily
less complete than an actual purpose inquiry, the reasonable
observer could cursorily determine that while the school
board’s purpose may have been based on a misunderstanding
of law, it was not based on an impermissible purpose of advancing religion. This is the sort of situation in which any actual impermissible purpose may not be caught, and the safety
net of the effects-endorsement analysis would have sole responsibility for catching an Establishment Clause violation.281
Of course, the malleable reasonable observer also could reach a
very different determination: that the school board disregarded
intelligent design’s religious connections and the constitutional
importance of keeping religious instruction separate from pubservices, school-based mental health programs, and other initiatives. Again,
private schools are eligible for this funding—if they will use the funding to
provide “secular, neutral and nonideological services, materials, and
equipment . . . .” § 5142(a)(1)(A)(i). Finally, this sentiment is reiterated in Title IX
General Provisions, clarifying that with respect to major portions of the act in
which private schools may be eligible for NCLB funds, the “educational services
or benefits” provided to those schools “must be secular, neutral, and
nonideological.” § 9501(a)(2).
280. See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(1984).
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lic school curricula. In other words, if the school board receives
legal advice that it should be able to recognized as flawed, it
could appear unlikely that the school board had truly based its
decision on the stated reason, in which case an actual purpose
analysis is even more important. Again, we see the reasonable
observer’s inconsistency and unpredictability in the wake of
McCreary County.
Second, a school board’s decision to rely on legal advice of
questionable credibility suggests more clearly that other motives were at play, and that the stated purpose is a sham intended to disguise an impermissible purpose of advancing
religion. This situation would likely result in a more invasive
apparent purpose inquiry, but it is important to remember that
in an intelligent design controversy, religion-based motives are
less likely to be blatant and more likely to be discovered only
through depositions and written discovery.282 Some courts have
constrained the reasonable observer’s perspective to facts that
are easily knowable,283 but, to be fair, courts have also applied
this same limit to their own analyses of actual purpose, not
necessarily digging into discovery to strike down a statute or
policy as motivated by an impermissible government purpose.284 Nevertheless, after McCreary County, the reasonable
observer’s knowledge of the government actors’ expressions of
intent is necessarily more limited than a court’s.285 Although a
court may choose to rely on public facts such as statements
made at school board meetings and to the press, the court is
not confined to examining public facts. A reasonable observer
is confined to that material. In a situation such as an intelligent
design debate, damning facts, if they exist, are much less likely
to be public, thus requiring a more intensive investigation of
government purpose.286

282. See, e.g., Lebo, supra note 231 (reporting deposition testimony regarding
public and private comments of school board members about intelligent design
and creationism). In a state such as Illinois, the plaintiffs could even request the
audio recording of a closed-session board meeting, because maintaining audio
records has been mandatory since January 2004. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2.06
(2005).
283. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
284. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2736–37 (2005).
285. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 748–62
(M.D. Pa. 2005).
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For these reasons, importing the reasonable observer into the
government purpose analysis affects the analysis of both issues
of law and issues of fact in peculiar ways, making the reasonable observer ever more a fiction in the colloquial sense of the
word, parting ways with a typical member of the community
not by inches but by yards.
C.

The Ever-Important Standard of Review

After McCreary County, the government purpose inquiry,
which is particularly critical in an intelligent design case where
courts will evaluate the perceived credibility of the government’s proffered purpose from the perspective of a reasonable
observer, changes from a finding of fact to a question of law.
As such, district courts’ government purpose analyses now will
be reviewed uniformly de novo. Before McCreary County, the
circuits were split on the proper standard of review for findings of fact within a government purpose analysis, so even
though this change will bring coherence to a small part of a
fractured doctrine (the procedure, not the substance), it is an
apparently unforeseen, and, for the reasons explained below,
inadequately justified if not detrimental consequence of
McCreary County.
Like the burden of proof at trial, the standard of review on
appeal is so important that, at times, it is effectively outcomedeterminative.287 Generally, a district court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error: whether “the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed.”288 Its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo: they may be reversed merely if the reviewing court, standing in the place of the trial court, would have
reached a different result. This distinction permits trial courts,
with their greater proximity to the evidence and witnesses, to
make factual findings to which appellate courts defer significantly.289 By contrast, trial courts’ legal conclusions receive
greater scrutiny from appellate courts, which have more time
to deliberate about what precedent requires as well as greater
287. See, e.g., Bryan Adamson, All Facts Are Not Created Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 629, 629 (2004); Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential
Robes?: A Deconstruction of the Standard of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal
System, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 531 (2004).
288. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
289. See Nicolas, supra note 287, at 533–34.
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responsibility to direct the development of the law.290 Perhaps
predictably, Establishment Clause cases present an exception to
these general rules.
The circuits are split regarding the proper level of deference
appropriate for district courts regarding findings of fact in Establishment Clause cases, but all circuits examine conclusions
of law de novo. Specifically, the Third,291 Sixth,292 and Tenth293
Circuits review constitutional facts (facts “fundamental to the
existence of a constitutional right,” an erratically applied concept)294 de novo, while reviewing lower courts’ determinations
of subsidiary facts for clear error. The Fourth,295 Seventh,296 and
Eleventh297 Circuits review all findings of fact in Establishment
Clause cases for clear error. Nearly twenty years before
McCreary County, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch v.
Donnelly (in which she introduced the reasonable observer and
the endorsement test) reviewed a lower court’s government
purpose inquiry for clear error.298 More recently, the Eleventh
Circuit made clear that an inquiry into actual government purpose was a factual inquiry under circuit law.299 This is consistent with circuit courts’ general recognition that the evaluation
of government purpose is based on facts, whether the circuit is
290. See Adamson, supra note 287, at 630.
291. See Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist.,
386 F.3d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 2004); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly,
309 F.3d 144, 156–57 (3d Cir. 2002).
292. See ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir.
2004); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 2002).
293. See O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2005);
Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 922 (10th Cir. 2002);
Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2002).
294. Adamson, supra note 287, at 633 (quoting Martin Louis, Allocating
Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified
View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64
N.C. L. REV. 993, 995 n.13 (1986)). The Supreme Court and lower courts do not
apply the constitutional facts doctrine with much, if any, uniformity. Accordingly,
although the constitutional facts doctrine does control non-jury First Amendment
malice cases, it does not control all First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Ronald J.
Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1769, 1786 (2003); see also Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De
Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427, 1442–43 (2001).
295. See Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 254 F.3d 496, 508 (4th Cir. 2001).
296. See Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 2001).
297. See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1291, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2003); King
v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).
298. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
299. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1296–97.
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one that classifies those facts as constitutional or not. Nevertheless, after McCreary County, the inquiry into government purpose from the reasonable observer’s perspective has become a
matter of law, and thus subject to de novo review across the
circuits.300
While uniformity among circuits about a procedural or substantive matter generally is preferable to a circuit split, the
resolution of such a split should occur after thorough consideration of the divergent rules, their origins, and their effects. If
the Court in McCreary County considered the issue of the
changing standard of review, the opinions do not discuss it.
Setting aside the Court’s silence, a compelling reason for de
novo review of a government purpose inquiry would be for
appellate courts to develop and maintain a coherent body of
substantive case law, even if limited to intra-circuit consistency.301 But, given the general incoherence of the Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause cases, any sort of substantive
doctrinal consistency will almost necessarily be elusive in Establishment Clause cases generally and in intelligent design
cases particularly. Consider the results of Establishment Clause
cases that have peppered the dockets of courts of appeals
across the country for the past decade: The overwhelming
number of these cases have been reviewed de novo, either because the reviewing court is evaluating the propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss, or
because it is evaluating constitutional facts or a conclusion of
law.302 However, these cases as a whole were not bound together by a predictable, or predictive, set of legal rules; at times
300. The Second Circuit, for example, has specifically held that it reviews a
reasonable observer’s conclusion de novo. Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245
F.3d 49, 75 (2d Cir. 2001).
301. As the Supreme Court accepts an average of eighty to eighty-five cases per
term, the federal courts of appeals in this country establish the vast majority of
binding federal precedent.
302. See, e.g., Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson County, 407 F.3d 266, 268
(4th Cir. 2005) (motion to dismiss); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County,
387 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc.
v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (motion to dismiss, as well as Eleventh
Amendment immunity and statute of limitations issues); Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch.
Dist., 382 F.3d 807, 812 (8th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment); Am. Family Ass’n,
Inc. v. City of S.F., 277 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) (motion to dismiss); Knights
of Columbus, Counsel No. 94 v. Town of Lexington, 272 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2001)
(summary judgment); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 2000)
(summary judgment); Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259, 264 (6th Cir.
2000) (summary judgment).
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religious displays were permitted, at times rejected. These decisions became consistent only in their lack of consistency, on
occasion presenting apparent conflicts within a circuit.303 Even
the recent pair of Supreme Court cases that grew out of this
morass only answers questions at the extreme ends of the factual and legal spectra. The resulting unpredictability is not a
satisfactory return for the considerable investment of private
and judicial resources that the de novo review of these cases
has required.304
Thus, if (or when) a critical mass of intelligent design cases
reaches district courts across the country, those courts inevitably will invest their reasonable observers with extensive
knowledge of matters of law. Reasonable observers will presumably know a good deal about the theory of evolution, the
concept of intelligent design, NCLB’s lack of requirements regarding teaching intelligent design, and other similar issues.305
The factors that will vary significantly from case to case are the
public and private statements of the relevant government actors, which are arguably the reasonable observer’s greatest
non-textual (and, as argued above, sometimes inaccessible)
clues to apparent government purpose.
After district courts take their turn, courts of appeals will
uniformly exercise the least amount of deference possible to
lower courts over essentially factual determinations in a messy
area of law guided by unclear precedent. Despite what will certainly be their best efforts, the various courts of appeals will
remain predisposed to reaching effectively inconsistent results.
Because of likely narrow factual distinctions between intelligent design cases, this effect also could occur within circuits.
303. Compare Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005) (permitting
display of Ten Commandments monument on the lawn of a county
administration building), with Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d
766 (7th Cir. 2001) (not allowing a state to accept a Ten Commandments
monument and display it on the grounds of the state house). See also ACLU Neb.
Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004) (disallowing a Ten
Commandments display in a public park); Freethought Soc’y of Greater Phila. v.
Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (permitting a Ten Commandments
plaque to remain posted on the exterior of a county courthouse); Adland v. Russ,
307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002) (not permitting the relocation of a Ten Commandments monument to the state capitol complex); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297
F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2002) (not permitting the city to accept and display a Ten
Commandments monument).
304. See Nicolas, supra note 287, at 533–34; see also Adamson, supra note 287, at
630.
305. See supra Parts IV.B.1–4.
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Even if reasonable observers have a consistent presumed universe of knowledge—an occurrence that is theoretically possible but highly unlikely—factually distinguishing these cases
from one another should not be difficult. This will create space
for cases that draw peculiar distinctions and are in effect at
odds with one another.306 Accordingly, the additional investment of judicial resources at the appellate level through a de
novo review of the government purpose inquiry is unlikely to
have much, if any, unifying effect on the emerging body of intelligent design case law either among or within the circuits.
Therefore, as the intelligent design context illustrates, the
value of an actual governmental purpose inquiry has not dissipated. If anything, this inquiry has become more crucial to
maintaining government actors’ and courts’ legitimacy when
courts confront intelligent design policies and statutes. For
these reasons, a slight retreat from McCreary County is well advised. Despite inevitable invitations to do otherwise, the Court
should affirm McCreary County’s central holding and maintain
the importance of the government purpose inquiry. It should,
however, limit the role of the reasonable observer to the effectsendorsement analysis.
V.

CONCLUSION

With McCreary County and so many other Establishment
Clause cases decided 5-4, and Justice O’Connor often serving as
a swing vote, this doctrine is one of many at a crossroads following her retirement. Whether the reasonable observer will
fade away absent its creator and erstwhile champion remains
to be seen, but it seems unlikely, at least, that the reasonable
observer’s departure is imminent. Either way, the necessary
results of McCreary County reach too far. The altered notion of
the constitutional harm and limited scope of the objective observer’s review, the expansion of the objective observer’s necessary knowledge of law yet contraction of knowledge of facts
in what is at core a factual inquiry, and the mandatory change
in the standard of review without sufficient justification—each
of these detrimental effects of McCreary County will become
obvious as courts grapple with issues such as the burgeoning
evolution-intelligent design disputes. For these reasons, gov306. The Van Orden-McCreary County pairing is just such an example from the
highest Court in the land.
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ernment purpose should not be perceived by the distanced
eyes of the objective, reasonable observer, but rather ascertained for actuality by the blinder-free eyes of courts.

